Need based aid from selective universities and the achievement gap between rich and poor by MYONG, Sunha
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
10-2016
Need based aid from selective universities and the
achievement gap between rich and poor
Sunha MYONG
Singapore Management University, sunhamyong@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, and the Education Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
MYONG, Sunha. Need based aid from selective universities and the achievement gap between rich and poor. (2016). 1-80. Research
Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2036
Need-Based Aid from Selective Universities and




I study the role of need-based aid from selective universities in closing the achievement gap
between rich and poor high school students. I focus on the incentive aspect of need-based
aid that can change high school student’s effort choices. The impact of increasing need-based
aid depends on the extent of borrowing constraints and how competition affects the relative
performance of low- and high-income students. I develop a structural model of students’ learning,
application, and admission processes, and estimate it with the Education Longitudinal Study
of 2002, a nationally representative sample. I control for other types of barriers for low-income
students such as a lack of information or low high school quality. I use a geographic variation
in costs of attending home-state nonselective universities to control selection biases driven by
an unobservable characteristic correlated with family income. I find that 6.9% of high-ability
low-income students do not apply to selective universities because of borrowing constraints.
If selective universities double the amount of grants per attending student from the bottom
quintile of the income distribution, the effort gap, as measured by the number of Advanced
Placement (AP) classes taken, decreases by 33.4%, the achievement gap, as measured by the
SAT score, by 20.2%, and the wage gap by 10.2% among students with the initial test scores in
the top 20th percentile in 10th grade. The aggregate achievement score also increases because
elevated competition raises the effort level of high ability applicants from all income backgrounds.
Doubling need-based aid can close the achievement gap better than merit-based aid that requires
the same budget by 21%, while they have similar impacts on the aggregate achievement level.
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1 Introduction
Based on a nationally representative sample of high school students in the United States, I observe
a widening achievement gap between rich and poor students in test scores during high school. For
example, looking at students within the top 10th percentile of standardized scores in 10th grade,
students from the top quintile of income distribution obtain SAT scores 95 points higher than those
from the bottom quintile of income distribution.1 Previous studies usually focused on different
ability, parental investment, and high school quality between rich and poor students to explain the
achievement gap.2 However, I find that students’ own effort choice is also a significant determinant
of the widening achievement gap during high school. For example, the regression result suggests
that different effort choices, as measured by the number of Advanced Placement classes students
take, explain 28% of the conditional achievement gap related to family income. This finding is
relevant to understanding a source of persisting income inequality across generations because the
achievement score of students accounts for substantial variations in labor earnings within the same
education group.3
What can be a cost effective way to close the achievement gap between rich and poor high
school students? I focus on need-based financial aid from selective universities.4 Because of the
competitive admission processes for the limited capacity, students who apply to selective univer-
sities, almost half of four-year college attendees, generally put more efforts into their studies such
as taking Advanced Placement (AP) classes. This, in turn, leads to higher achievement scores.
However, there exists a large disparity between rich and poor students in terms of college applica-
tion behaviors, in particular, whether to apply for selective universities or not.5 Although recent
studies focused on information disparity regarding college opportunity6, I focus on need-based aid
for following reasons. First, the direct cost of college education is still a significant determinant
of the application decision for selective universities. In particular, $10,000 increase in tuition of
home-state nonselective universities increases the application rate for selective universities by 5.0%.
More importantly, low-income students are more sensitive to the direct cost; they increase the ap-
plication rate by 1.6% more than the average students if attending nonselective universities becomes
more expensive by $10,000. Second, although selective universities have increased financial aid per
student by more than 60% over the last decade, more selective universities started to award grants
1Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002. It is the sum of the verbal and math SAT scores.
The pattern holds for other percentiles of the standardized test scores in 10th grade.
2For example, see Todd and Wolpin (2007) and Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005).
3For example, see Hanushek and Weissman (2008) and Neal and Johnson (1996).
4Selective universities refer to the four-year colleges in the United States that belong to the top two categories
among the seven categories of the NCES-Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index Data Files 2004. According to
this classification, selective universities account for about 20% of four-year enrollment.
5Focusing on students within the top 20th percentile of the initial test scores, students from the top quintile of
income distribution apply 13% more to selective universities than those from the bottom quintile income distribution.
6For example, see Hoxby and Turner (2013).
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to middle- and high-income students by redefining need-based aid or increasing merit-based aid.7
In this paper, I quantify to what extent additional need-based aid from selective universities can
close the achievement gap between rich and poor students. In particular, I focus on the incentive
aspect of need-based aid from selective universities that can change high school students’ effort
choices. In doing so, I examine how tuition subsidies from selective universities affect high school
students’ forward looking behaviors when they make choices about the number of AP classes to
take, private high school attendance, and college applications. This is an empirical question because
the size of impact depends on the extent of borrowing constraints, the importance of other types
of barriers such as a lack of information, and how elevated competition affects student’s choices
conditional on family income and student ability.
My paper is the first to quantify the impact of financial aid on high school students’ academic
achievement when there is competition among students for the limited capacity in selective univer-
sities. Unlike need-based aid from nonselective universities or state-funded merit based aid such
as Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship,8 the chance of receiving financial aid from selective universities
depends on student’s relative academic performance compared to all other applicants. Also, this
paper is the first to evaluate how borrowing constraints in college financing affect high school stu-
dent’s effort choices and test scores. Most previous studies take high school test score as a fixed
ability measure.
To quantify the impact of additional need-based aid from selective universities, I develop a struc-
tural model of student’s learning, application, and admission processes. In the model, attending
selective universities provides pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits. However, attending selective
universities is much more expensive than attending nonselective universities. A highly competitive
admissions process exists for the limited seats in selective universities, and that process focuses
mainly on students’ academic achievements. Students decide (i) whether to attend private high
school, (ii) how many AP classes to take during high school, and (iii) whether to apply for selective
universities. After the admission result is realized, the student takes out student loans to finance
the net cost of college education. Borrowing constraints could limit student’s borrowing capacity as
a fraction of her future annual earnings. The admission probability is determined in an equilibrium
such that given the admission cutoff value in test scores, the number of seats in selective universities
is equal to the number of attendees.
I estimate the model based on three data sets: (i) the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002
(ELS2002), (ii) the Integrated Postsecondary Education System Data (IPEDS 2004), and (iii) the
NCES-Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index Data Files 2004. The main data set is the
7Table 11 and Table12.
8The HOPE Scholarship (Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally) is originated in Georgia which has awarded
grants to students in state public and private colleges from 1993. Funded by the state lottery, $3 billion in grants
were awarded to 900,000 Georgia students from 1993 to 2006. In the original program, to become eligible a student
has to have B average GPA.
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ELS2002, which provides a wide range of students’ demographic characteristics, high school cur-
riculum choices and test scores, the college application and admission results, and the hourly wage
rate. I use the IPEDS for tuition information and the NCES-Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness
Index to define college selectivity. Four particular variables are useful in identifying the model.
First, the geographic variations of tuition of home-state nonselective universities and the cost for
the room and books are important exogenous variations in identifying students’ responses to fi-
nancial incentives. Second, I use the total amount of student loans to identify the intertemporal
preference over the consumption between college and the work period. Then the different choices of
student loans between rich and poor students help to identify the extent of borrowing constraints.
Third, the number of information sources about the college application process helps to control the
potential information barrier facing poor students. Fourth, the number of AP classes offered by
high schools is used to account for different learning environments across students.
The impact of additional need-based aid from selective universities on the achievement gap
between rich and poor is not obvious for the following reasons. First, low-income students receive
more than twice the amount of aid from selective universities as high-income students. Therefore, it
is not clear whether low-income students at the margin of the application are borrowing constrained.
If the main reason that those marginal students did not apply for selective universities was the
low admission probability, tuition subsidies might not affect their behaviors. Second, other types
of barriers, for example, the information barrier regarding the college application process or the
disparity in the number of AP classes available in high school, can be too high for low-income
students to respond to the financial incentive. Third, elevated competition driven by an increased
number of applicants could affect the behavior of high-income students. If high-income students also
increase their effort levels to remain competitive, and can further increase test scores by spending
more money, for example, by attending private high school, the achievement gap could increase.
The estimated model provides four sets of quantitative results. First, although need-based
aid from selective universities is already extensive, 6.9% of low-income students do not apply
for selective universities because of borrowing constraints. Focusing on students within the top
quintile of initial test score distribution, borrowing constraints increase the effort gap by 14.0%,
the achievement gap by 8.4%, and the wage gap by 4.7%. Second, further increases in need-based
aid from selective universities can not only reduce the achievement gap between rich and poor
students, but also increase the aggregate effort level. In particular, if selective universities double the
amount of grants per attending student from the bottom quintile of the income distribution, which
corresponds to $12,000 more annual grants per low-income attendee, the average effort level of those
low-income high school students increases by 13.4%. This decreases the effort gap by 33.4%, the
achievement gap by 20.2%, and the wage gap by 10.2% among students in the top 20th percentile
of standardized scores in 10th grade. By relaxing borrowing constraints facing low-income high
ability students whose effort choice would be most elastic to tuition subsidies, need-based aid can
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effectively reduce the achievement gap between rich and poor students. Also, increasing need-based
aid increases the aggregate effort level by 0.7%. Focusing on those who actually increase the effort
level, low-income students increase by 52.1% and high-income students increase by 12.0%. Because
of the tournament effect–the additional effort applicants put forth to increase the probability of
admission–is more elastic to student ability than to family income, elevated competition increases
the effort level of all high ability applicants. Third, as a counterfactual policy analysis, I compare
the impact of doubling need-based aid to merit-based aid from selective universities. I find that
need-based aid can close the achievement gap better then merit-based aid by 21.1%, while keeping
the aggregate achievement level almost the same. Merit-based aid is not significantly better at
providing incentives to students. Because merit-based aid also increases the test score of high-
income students, some low-income high-ability students are discouraged from application. Finally,
for a comparison of the existing policies, I examine the impact of changing admission criteria similar
to the Texas Top 10 Law—where only the high school GPA is taken into account in the admission
process. The Texas Top 10 Law9 can substantially reduce the achievement gap among students
in the top quintile of the initial test scores, as measured by SAT scores, by 39.5%. However, the
aggregate effort level decreases by 49.2%, which corresponds to a $1,300 dollar reduction in annual
average income of low-income high-ability students.
To examine the validity of the structural model, I consider an out-of-sample prediction by using
the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, a representative sample with almost identical
survey instruments to the ELS2002. Assuming that changes in the financial aid policy from selective
universities are exogenous, I compare the observed pattern in the NELS1988 data with the predicted
outcomes in the estimated model. Looking at the composition rate of applicants and attendees in
selective universities conditional on the family income quintile, the difference between the model
and the NELS1988 data is less than 3%.
The paper is organized as follows. I discuss related literature in Section 2. The data and
motivating facts are described in Section 3. I explain the model and choices of high school students
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the identification of the model. Section 6 describes the estimation
method. Section 7 documents the estimation result. Section 8 presents the counterfactual analysis.
Section 9 shows an out-of-sample prediction. Section 10 concludes.
2 Related Literature
First, this paper quantifies how financial aid for college education can affect the high school achieve-
ment score. This complements the existing literature which mainly discusses the impact of tuition
subsidies on college attainment results (Cameron and Taber (2004), Cameron and Heckman (1998),
9Since 1997, every high school student in Texas who ranks in the top 10% of her class is a guaranteed admission
at state-funded universities.
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and Lochner and Monge (2002)). Also, this paper relates to Becker and Tomes (1994) which shows
how borrowing constraints can explain the different educational investments between rich and poor
students. As an extension, this paper studies the impact of increasing need-based aid from selec-
tive universities on high school students’ effort choices, private high school attendance, and test
scores. Kinsler and Pavan (2011) shows that family income is significant determinant of the qual-
ity of higher education especially among high-ability students. This paper extends their analysis
by investigating how different college application behavior between rich and poor students are re-
lated to the achievement gap, and by accounting for different structural channels—initial academic
achievement, high school type, unobservable characteristic, and borrowing constraints for college
financing—through which family income affect choices of high school students.
Second, this paper estimates the quantitative importance of the competitive college admission
processes on student’s effort choices at the high school level. This relates to Hickman (2013) which
studies the impact of race-based affirmative action in the college admission process on students’
effort choices based on the auction theoretical framework. The main difference is that this paper
focuses on the interaction between borrowing constraints and competitive admission processes,
whereas the college financing is not considered in Hickman (2013). By differentiating family income
from ability, this paper isolates the impact of financial incentives on student’s effort choices in the
presence of a competitive admission process.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature regarding the impact of the college admission
processes on the student-college assignment. Previous studies focus on race-based affirmative ac-
tion (Arcidiacono (2005) and Hickman (2013)) or the Texas Top 10 Law (Kapor, 2014). This
paper focuses on need-based aid from selective universities, a major policy instrument of selective
universities to recruit high ability low-income students.10 This paper also relates to Hoxby and
Turner (2013) which shows the importance of information barriers facing low-income students to
explain different application behaviors for selective universities between rich and poor students.
By controlling the number of information sources about college application processes, this paper
evaluates the impact of need-based aid in the presence of information barriers.
Finally, the structural model allows me to compare the counterfactual impact of need-based aid
with other policies such as merit-based aid or the Texas Top 10 Law on the achievement gap and
the aggregate achievement level. Dynarsky (2010) and Kane (2003) evaluate the treatment effect of
state-funded merit-based aid on student’s enrollment decisions.11 Based on reduced form analyses,
10On the other hand, some studies focus on the strategic behaviors of students and colleges. For example, Fu
(2014) estimates the equilibrium matching model between students and colleges, focusing on the processes by which
colleges set tuition and admission rules and students make application and enrollment decisions. Fillmore (2014)
shows how colleges capture a large share of matching surplus through price discrimination, as a result of collecting
student information from the Free Application Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). Different from those studies that take
students’ academic achievement at the moment of college application are taken as given, the main focus of this paper
is to show how test scores can change as students adjust their effort choices at the high school level.
11Van De Klaauw (2002) shows that merit-based aid at an institutional level can effectively raise enrollment rates
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they find that those merit-based scholarships significantly increases the enrollment rates into state
universities12. They find that merit-based aid from state universities benefits mostly the middle-
and high-income students and it widens the achievement gap between rich and poor students. This
paper contributes to the literature by focusing on need-based aid from selective universities and
showing that need-based aid from selective universities can reduce the achievement gap better than
merit-based aid with the same amount of budget.13
3 Data
3.1 Sample Description
I use the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002), the Integrated Postsecondary Edu-
cation Data System (IPEDS), and the NCES-Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index 2004
to estimate the model. The ELS2002 is a nationally representative sample of United States high
school students, following the sample up to eight years after high school graduation. The ELS2002
was initially surveyed in 2002 with 10th graders, and there were three follow-ups in 2004, 2006, and
2012. Publicly available data includes comprehensive information such as the students’ academic
achievements as measured by standardized test scores, school characteristics, family background,
college attendance/graduation, and the wage rate. However, the information to which university
the student applied, admitted or attended, is not available in the public data. For this reason, I
used a restricted data set. Restricted data of the ELS2002 includes a complete history of college
education: all institutions to which the student applied, admitted, and attended are listed. For
students who attended more than one college, I focus on the first college the student attended.
The original sample size of the ELS2002 is about 35,000 10th graders in 2002. This paper only
focuses on four-year college attendees. I dropped data with missing information such as the initial
math score, parents’ educational attainment, family income, high school type, SAT, GPA, and AP
score, or the history of college application, admission and attendance, and the wage rate. The final
sample size is 3,080.14
The transcript data in the ELS2002 allows me to observe the entire history of a student’s
high school curriculum choices. In particular, I track the total number of AP classes taken by
students during high school years. Also, I can observe the number of AP classes offered by the high
school, which helps to account for the different learning environments across high schools. For high
in the presence of competition among colleges for students by using the Regression Discontinuity approach.
123-7% increase in the enrollment rate into the state universities if the amount of grants increases by $1,000.
13The total amount of grants from selective universities per year, most of which are awarded based on students’
financial need, is $3 billion (IPEDS 2012). This is equivalent to the amount of grants from the Georgia’s HOPE
Scholarship program during 1993-2006.
14Wage rates are observed in the 3rd follow up and the attrition rate is high.
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school achievement, I use three scores: SAT, GPA, and the AP score.15 Observing students’ initial
academic achievement as measured by the standardized math score in 10th grade16 is useful to
control for different achievement levels at the earlier period of high school. Having early academic
achievement helps to quantify how student’s own effort choice and high school type contribute to
achieving high test scores.
The total student loan amount reported in 2013 (eight years after high school graduation) is
used to infer annual loan amount. The ELS2002 has information on the fraction of total grants for
tuition that students receive at the first-attended postsecondary institution. I use tuition reported
by colleges to the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) to infer the amount of
grants each student receives. I include the number of information sources available to students
about the college application process.17 This helps to control for information disparity between
the rich and the poor, an issue which has received increasing public and policy interest.18. The
ELS2002 also has data reported in 10th grade on students’ preference for certain features of college
education. For example, students ranked the importance of the college’s reputation on a scale
1 to 3. To account for the pure preference difference in application behaviors across students I
include student’s reported preference for the college’s reputation, location, and whether her parents
attended the same college.
The IPDES has two pieces of important information. First, I use the posted tuition and fee of
each university along with the cost of room, board, and books to account for the direct costs of
college education. I assume that tuition of nonselective universities is the average tuition of nonse-
lective universities in student’s home state. I also account for home state discounts as reported by
each institution in the IPEDS (Figure 3- 4).19 Second, I include the number of selective universi-
ties in students’ home states. Including exogenous geographic variations, presumably independent
of student’s unobservable characteristic, is useful in controlling the selection bias driven by the
potential correlation between family income and unobservable characteristic.
I use NCES-Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index 2004, to define college selectivity. It
15There are more than twenty AP tests, each of which has a scale of 1-5. I use the average AP test score with an
equal weight for each subject. I allow the possibility that students can take AP tests without attending AP classes.
16This is the earliest achievement test score available in the sample. I check how this score could change between
8th and 10th grade from the comparable data set, the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988. Those two
samples share almost the same survey instruments. I found that the correlation between the standardized math score
in 8th grade and in 10th grade is 0.89. The t-test shows that the growth rate does not based on whether the student
attends private high schools or not.
17The questionnaire asks 10th grade high school students about whether they obtain information about college
application processes from parents, high school counselor, teachers, coaches, relatives, etc.
18Low application rate for selective universities by high-achieving low-income students has motivated a policy
intervention to reduce information barriers facing low-income students, for instance, sending out a packet about the
college application process (Hoxby et al. ,2013)
19For the tuition of private high school, I use the aggregate data in 2002 from the National Center for Educational
Statistics (NCES).
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covers all four-year colleges across the United States and provides an admission-competitive index
for each university. There are seven categories of selectivity level in NCES-Barron’s Index, but in
this paper, selective universities are in the top two categories of the index in 2004.20 This leads to
103 selective universities out of 1,247 post secondary institutions in 2004. In my sample 20% of all
four-year college enrollees in my sample attend selective universities.
3.2 Descriptive Analysis
Increasing Achievement Gap between Rich and Poor Students
If I look at the SAT score (the sum of verbal and math SAT scores) of students within the top 10th
percentile of the standardized math score in 10th grade, students from the top quintile of income
distribution receive 95 higher score than students from the bottom quintile of income distribution.
If I look at students within the top 20th percentile of the standardized math score in 10th grade,
the corresponding number is 75 SAT points. Although students had the same test scores in 10th
grade, the achievement level, as measured by SAT score, at the moment of high school graduation
is higher for rich students than poor students. Figure 2 describes the distribution of the SAT score
of low- and high-income students who had the top quintile of initial test scores in 10th grade.
Table 1 shows the linear regression of the log SAT score on student’s initial test scores, family
income, and other demographic characteristics. The coefficient of the log family income before
controlling for the number of AP classes taken is 0.037. This implies that 10% higher family
income corresponds to 3.7% higher SAT score. If I control the number of AP classes taken, it
decreases to 2.6%. Thus, the elasticity of the SAT score with respect to family income decreases
by 28% if I control student’s own effort choices.
High School Achievement and Wage Rate
Table 2 shows the linear regression of the wage rate on high school achievement, family backgrounds,
and curriculum choice. Column (3) indicates that log SAT (with a coefficient of 0.242) and log
GPA (0.207) scores significantly increase the log hourly wage, after controlling race, gender, high
school curriculum choice, initial math score, family income, parents’ education, and two personality
traits: motivation and action control. 21 Table 3 shows that log SAT (0.166) and log GPA (0.125)
remain significant after controlling for college major, dropout, and further education. These results
suggest that high school achievements predict a significant portion of early period wage rate.
To see a long-run effect I use the other data set, the National Longitudinal Study of Youth
1979. Table 4 shows the wage regression result. It is a pooling estimation of the panel data that
20Wage premium from attending colleges with the top two categories are significantly different from that of attending
the rest of four-year colleges.
21The motivation variable measures student’s attitude toward financial success in life.
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include the hourly wage over more than 20 years after high school graduation. Column (2) and (3)
suggest that including SAT instead of AFQT (The Armed Forces Qualification Test) increases the
R-square by 0.03. Column (4) suggests that if I include both SAT and AFQT score and interactions
with the age, log SAT score significantly increases the level of the wage rate (with a coefficient of
0.63), while its impact on the growth rate (SAT×AGE) is not significant.
Cost of Attending Selective Universities and Composition Rate by Income
Table 8 documents tuition, cost of room, board and books at different types of colleges. Tuition
of selective universities is 65% more expensive than that of nonselective universities for students
from out of state. If I include tuition (before subtracting financial aid) and the cost of room, board
and books, the average direct cost of attending selective universities was $35,240 dollars per year
in 2004, as compared to $22,240 dollars per year for nonselective colleges.
Figure 5 and Table 6 show the composition of students in selective universities from each quintile
of income distribution conditional on student’s family income. Students from the highest income
quintile families comprise 42.6% of attendees in selective universities, whereas only 8.4% of stu-
dents come from the bottom quintile of income distribution. Figure 9(a) and 9(b) document the
attendance rate (attendees/all), application rate (applicants/all), and admission probability (at-
tendees/applicants) of students by income quintile. Figure 9(a) shows the measures of students at
all achievement levels, whereas Figure 9(b) shows the measures for high-achieving students within
the top 20th math scores in 10th grade. In aggregate, family income is positively correlated with
all three measures. For high-ability students, Figure shows an inverted U-shape. The admission
probability upon application is actually higher for students from the lowest income quintile distri-
bution than those from the highest income quintile distribution. However, still the application rate
of high-ability students from the bottom quintile of income distribution is 13% lower than that of
high-ability students from the top quintile of income distribution.
Financial Aid from Selective and Nonselective Universities
Figure 10 shows the average amount of institutional grant per student at selective and nonselective
universities in 2012. Students with a family income of $30,000 received more than twice as much aid
as students with a family income of $110,000 at selective universities. 22 At nonselective universities,
students from the richest families receive more aid from because nonselective universities also have
merit-based aid. Table 9 shows the regression result of the amount of grants students received in
ELS2002 sample. The amount of aid from selective universities decreases substantially as family
income increases. Thus, although the sticker price of attending selective universities is much more
22The income classification is based on the data in the IPEDS 2004.
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expensive, attending selective universities can be less expensive for low-income students than high-
income students.
Figure 11 shows the trend in institutional grants from selective and nonselective universities
from 2000 to 2012 (the IPEDS). The institutional grants offered by selective universities increased
by more than 60% over the last decade, whereas there is only a minor increase in institutional
grants offered by nonselective universities. Table 11 describes the recent introduction of the ‘no-
loan policy’ by top-ranked universities that replaces loans with grants from the financial aid package
especially for low-income students. For students with family income less than $60,000 attending
those top-universities would now receive a full tuition discount. Figure 12 shows the trend in the
average Pell Grant per student at selective and nonselective universities over the same period.
There is no significant difference in the trend between selective and nonselective universities, and
the average amount of a Pell Grant award increased less than $1,000 over the ten years per student.
However, although selective universities have increased average financial aid, recently more aid
is awarded to middle- and high-income students. As shown in Table 11 the ‘no-loan policy’ includes
increasing income level for qualifying for need-based aid. Table 12 shows a couple of examples of
recent changes in the average merit based aid from some selective universities. Some selective
universities increased merit-based aid, whereas others decreased it. within selective universities.
This might provide motivation to compare the impact of need-based aid from merit-based aid from
selective universities. 23
Not only need-based aid from selective universities is extensive, but also the size is quite large. In
2012-2013 academic year, the total amount of grants awarded to the first-year students in selective
universities was $3 billion among which $2.5 billion was accounted for institutional grants. This
is almost 40% of entire Pell Grants provided by the federal government during the same academic
year.24
Direct Costs, Information Barrier, and Application Behaviors
Table 15 shows the probit regression of application decision for selective universities on student’s
demographics, family income, test scores, the average cost of attending home-state nonselective
universities, and the number of information sources about college application processes. It suggests
23Because this information is not available in the IPEDS, I refer to the New York Times article that analyzes
Recent College Board data from more than 600 nonprofit colleges. The analysis suggests that half of selective
universities have increased the average amount of merit-based aid, whereas the other half have decreased after 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/08/education/edlife/8edlife chart.html
24Data comes from IPEDS2012. The corresponding numbers for nonselective universities were $14.9 billion and
$6.7 billion. On the other hand, the amount of Pell Grants of which 90% recipients come from families with less
than $40,000 annual income given to the first-year college attendees was $0.2 billion in selective universities and $5.8
billion in non-selective universities. Considering extensive need-based aid in selective universities, the proportion of
public expenditure that goes to low-income college attendees is much smaller in selective universities than nonselective
universities.
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that the direct cost as measured by the cost of attending home-state nonselective universities ex-
plains more the application behavior of students than the number of information sources available
to students. In particular, $10,000 increase in the cost of attending home-state nonselective uni-
versities raises the application rate by 5.0%. Importantly, low-income students are more sensitive
to the direct cost than students from other income levels. In particular, $10,000 increase in the
direct cost would raise the application rate of low-income students additionally by 1.6%. On the
other hand, additional information source increases the application rate only by 1.1%.25 Although
Hoxby and Turner (2013) show the importance of information barrier facing low-income students,
the regression result suggests that the direct cost of college education still matters to understand
the application gap between rich and poor students with similar academic qualification.
Advanced Placement Classes
Figure 9 describes the number of AP classes taken by students conditional on their family’s income
quintile. It also shows how applicants/attendees take different number of AP classes from others.
The average number of AP classes students take is 0.6 credit units higher for students from the
highest income distribution than those from the bottom income distribution quintile. However,
if I look at those who attend selective universities, students from the lowest income quintile take
more AP classes than those from the highest income quintile. On average, applicants and attendees
of selective universities take 2.7 and 3.5 AP classes respectively, whereas non-applicants and non-
attendees take 0.9 and 1.2 AP classes.
Figure 13 describes the number of AP classes offered by the high school of students who do
not take any AP classes. Of those nonparticipants, more than 25% of the students from the
bottom quintile of income distribution do not have AP classes available in high school, whereas the
corresponding number for the highest income quintile group is 15%.26
Table 13 shows the regression result of test scores on the number of AP classes students take,
controlling for other observable characteristics such as race, sex, initial math score, family income,
and the unit of math credits. It shows that students who take more AP classes obtain significantly
higher test scores. Tables 14 and Table 2 document the regression result of students’ college dropout
rate and the wage rate based on the number of AP classes and other observable characteristics.
Again, AP classes have a significant positive correlation with students’ higher graduation rate and
25If I compare the average number of information sources available to students, it is 3.4 for students from the
top quintile of income distribution and 2.9 for the bottom quintile of income distribution. Table 17 shows the
regression result of the number of information sources available to students about the college application processes.
Family income and attending private high school significantly increase the number of information sources available
to students.
26This motivated the government to increase policy interventions that aim to increase AP participation by low-
income students. For example, during 2002-2011, the Federal government granted $22 million in Advanced Placement
Incentive Program grants to 20-30 high schools in certain districts (Advanced Placement Incentive Program Grants).
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wage return. Table 5 is the regression result of SAT score including other types of effort choices
during high school. It suggests that AP class explains SAT score substantially more than other
types of effort choices such as the time spending on homework or the unit of total math credits.
4 The Model
I consider an individual who is about to enter a high school and live three periods. Everyone goes
to a four-year college after high school graduation, and there are two types of colleges: selective and
nonselective. A competitive admissions process exists for the limited seats in selective universities,
and that process focuses mainly on students’ academic achievements. In the first period, she engages
in high school education. At the beginning of the first period, she chooses whether to attend private
or public high school, how many AP classes to take, and whether to apply for selective universities.
Test scores, college admission result, and the amount of financial aid are realized at the end of
the high school. In the second period, she attends a college. She might dropout depending on
her academic preparation level, college selectivity, and a random shock. She finances the cost of
college education and takes student loans if necessary. In the third period, the individual becomes
a full time worker and repays student loans. Attending selective universities provides pecuniary
and nonpecuniary benefits. Its direct costs are much greater than those of attending nonselective
universities. The individual consumes during the last two periods. In what follows, first, I describe
the general description of the structural model, then I explain the empirical specification of each
component. Finally, I characterize choices of students and discuss the implication.
Let S = {A, θ,M1} be the vector of state variables that summarizes individual’s initial char-
acteristics at the moment of entering high school. A is the initial observable ability, θ is an
unobservable characteristic, and M1 is family income. Individual’s utility consists of four compo-
nents: the utility from consumption (Uc), the utility from nonpecuniary benefit from attending
selective universities (Usel), the utility cost of application (Uapply), and the utility cost of taking AP
classes (UAP ). To maximize the lifetime utility, individuals choose the following choice variables
X = {Iprivate, NAP , Iapply, L, C1, C2}, where Iprivate indicates whether to attend private high school
or not, NAP is the number of AP classes to take during high school, Iapply is whether to apply for
selective universities or not, L is the amount of student loan, and C1, C2 are consumption during
college and working periods. Throughout the process, there are four outcome variables that affect
student’s labor income and utility. Let Y = {H, Isel, IBA,M2} be the vector of outcome variables,
where H is the test score, Isel is whether to attend selective universities or not, IBA is whether
to finish college education or drop out, and M2 is labor income. Let  = {H , p, BA, w, AP } be
i.i.d. random shocks associated with Y = {H, Isel, IBA,M2} and the effort cost UAP . (H , p) are
realized at the end of the first period, BA is realized at the beginning of the second period, and
w is realized at the beginning of the third period. Attending a private high school costs tuition t
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which follows a normal distribution of N(µt, σ
2
t ). Students observe t before they decide whether to
attend private high school.
The test score H is determined following a learning technology, H = FH(x;A, θ, H) where
x = {Iprivate, NAP } are two inputs that affect the final test score. Note that the learning efficiency
is affected by initial observable ability A and unobservable characteristic θ. On the other hand,
H is realized at the end of the high school period. The admission criteria and financial aid policy
are exogenously given. There are stochastic components that affect (i) the admission into selective
universities (Iad), (ii) the college graduation (IBA), and (iii) tuition and the amount of financial aid
offered by selective and nonselective universities. I assume that once the test score H is realized,
the initial ability A becomes irrelevant. Let Pad(θ,H) be the probability of getting an admission
from selective universities upon application. Let g(θ,H) be the admission criteria and let h∗ be the
cutoff value in the test score that equalizes the number of seats available in selective universities
and the number of admitted students. Then Pad(θ,H) = P (Isel = 1|Iapply = 1) = P (g(θ,H) > h∗).
Let PBA be the probability of completing the college education, and it follows a stochastic process,
PBA = FBA(θ,H, Isel). Let Tsel and Tnon be realized tuition of selective and nonselective universities
respectively. Let Gsel and Gnon be aid offered by selective and nonselective universities respectively.
Gsel is a function of only family income M1 (completely need-based), while Gnon is affected by
both family income and the test score (M1, H) (both need and merit-based).
27 Therefore, the
direct cost of college education is determined by T s = Tsel − Gsel and Tn = Tnon − Gnon. Let
T = IselT
s − (1− Isel)Tn be realized net tuition.
At the moment of college entrance, the student knows (Isel, IBA, T ). She has correct information
about the expected labor market earning M2 = Ew [M2] = FM (θ,H, Isel, IBA, w). She has to
finance T , and she can take a student loan L from the capital market with a fixed interest rate
r and the repayment plan. There is no difference between a government loan and a private loan.
However, there is a friction in the capital market that reduces the maximum amount of loans
available compared to the complete market case, thus the student potentially faces borrowing
constraints. In particular, I assume that the student can borrow only up to a certain fraction of
her future expected income, L ≤ λM2.
Note that there are direct and indirect channels through which family income affect choices
of students. First, the direct channel is through financing the high school (if she attends private
high school) and college education. Second, the indirect channel is through the unobservable
characteristic θ. In particular, I allow that the distribution of θ to be correlated with the family
income, and θ is included in each process. Thus, besides the financing channel, all other correlations
between family income, choices of students, and economic outcomes are attributed to θ. The
student’s problem at the moment of high school entrance can be written as
27Data shows that test scores do not affect the amount of financial aid from selective universities but affect the
























′) + T k(S′) ≤M1 + Lk(S′)− tIprivate
Ck2 (S
′) ≤Mk2 (S′)− (1 + r)Lk(S′)
Lk(S′) ≤ λEw [Mk2 (S′)]
(4.2)
for all S′ = {H, IBA, w} and where k ∈ {n, s}. Note that the model does not include (i) student’s
portfolio choice within the same college selectivity and (ii) problems from the perspective of colleges
in terms of the choice about admission criteria, financial aid and tuition policy. Now I describe the
empirical specification of each component of the structural model.
4.1 Preference
I assume a log utility from consumption. β is the discount factor between the college and the
working period. Denoting consumption during the college and working period as C1, C2, the utility
from consumption can be written as
Uc(C1, C2) = ln(C1) + β ln(C2)
Next, I assume that the nonpecuniary benefit of attending selective universities (Usel) depends
on the student’s initial observable ability (A), unobservable characteristic (θ), the number of se-
lective universities in student’s home state (NSelHome), and the student’s preference for certain
features of college education such as location, reputation, and whether they want to attend the
same college as their parents attended (RPm). Ability measures in the nonpecuniary benefit are
expected to capture academic orientation or the capacity of handling peer pressures after attending
selective universities. The number of selective universities in student’s home state is expected to
capture the potential influence of growing up knowing more about elite universities and prestigious
campus life. On the other hand, the preference regarding certain feature of college’s characteristics
is included to capture pure preference heterogeneity.28
28One interesting find in Fu (2014) is that students’ preferences regarding different types of colleges vary substan-
tially even after controlling for SAT and family income.
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The effort cost of taking AP classes is affected by the student’s ability and the number of AP
classes offered by the high school Noffered. AP is the i.i.d. shock in the marginal effort cost.
UAP (NAP ) =
[
ξ0 + ξ1 ln(A) + ξ2θ + ξ3ln(Noffered) + AP
] ·NAP
Finally, the effort cost of the application also depends on the student’s ability, high school type
(private or public), the number of information sources available regarding the college application
process, Ninformation.
Uapply = ψ0 + ψ1θ + ψ2 · Ipublic + ψ3Ninformation
4.2 Unobservable Characteristic
There is one-dimensional unobservable characteristic across individuals denoted by θ. It might cap-
ture the time management skill or parents’ guidance that help students to obtain better outcomes.
θ is allowed to affect each part of the structural component: the wage rate, learning efficiency,
the nonpecuniary benefit from attending selective universities, application cost, and the admission
probability. It is known to individuals and colleges, but is not observed by econometrician. The
aggregate distribution of θ is assumed to have a normal distribution, in which the mean depends
on the student’s family income (M1) and the parent’s education (Edup).
θ = ψ1 ln(M1) + ψ2 ln(Edup) + θ
, where θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ). Although the mean of θ depends on family background, it is possible that
low- and high-income students have the same θ depending individual specific realization of θ.
4.3 Learning Technology
I assume that H = (HSAT , HAP , HGPA): there are three test scores - SAT, AP, and GPA, relevant
in the admission process, the wage rate, and graduation rate from the college. The test scores
depend on how many AP classes were taken and whether the student attends private high school.
Also, the learning efficiency is affected by the student’s characteristics Z = {A, θ, sex, race}. Each
test score has a unique learning technology. This could capture the difference between standardized
test scores such as SAT and AP and the GPA which is affected by the achievement level of peers. In
16
particular, if the average ability level of peers in a private high school is higher than that of public




κmjZm + κ5j ln(NAP + 1) + κ6jIprivate + Hj
, where Hj is i.i.d. random shock realized at the end of the high school period.
4.4 Admission Probability
I assume that the admission criteria are exogenously given and students are fully aware of the
rule. Selective universities rank applicants based on a measure for student’s merit, g(D), which is
a function of D = {race,H, θ}. Let h∗ be the cutoff value in g(D) that determines the admission




βjIrace,j + βt1 ln(SAT ) + βt2 ln(AP + 1) + βt3 ln(GPA) + θ4 ln(NAP + 1) + βt5θ + p
Let Pad(D) be the admission probability. Then Pad(D) = P (g(D) > h
∗) = Φ(g(D)− h∗).
4.5 Financial Aid
Let Gk be grants from college with selectivity k ∈ {sel, non}. Assume that the amount of financial
aid from selective universities is completely need-based, and it only depends on the quintile of the
student’s family income. On the other hand, the financial aid from nonselective universities has
both need-based and merit-based components. In particular, the amount of aid depends on both
income quintile and the academic achievement scores (SAT, AP, and GPA). Let DFk be the dummy
variable indicating the student’s family income belongs to k − th highest quintile, and let ζs and
ζn are i.i.d. random shocks. Thus the financial aid from each type of college is specified as follows.




Gnon = ζn0 +
4∑
k=1
ζnkDFk + ζnt1 ln(SAT ) + ζnt2 ln(AP + 1) + ζnt3 ln(GPA) + ζn
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4.6 Graduation Rate
After entering the college, the student faces a stochastic process determining whether she can grad-
uate from the college or drop out. The probability depends on the ability (θ), college preparatory
test scores (SAT, AP, and high school GPA), and student’s sex, and college selectivity Isel and a
random shock ηBA. Let PBA be the probability of obtaining BA degree and it can be written as
follows 29
PBA = P (s0 + s1Isel + s2female+ s3lnθ + s4 ln(SAT ) + s5 ln(AP + 1) + s6 ln(GPA) + BA > 0)
= Φ
(
s0 + s1Isel + s2female+ s3lnθ + s4 ln(SAT ) + s5 ln(AP + 1) + s6 ln(GPA)
)
4.7 Wage Rate
I assume that every student becomes a full time worker in the third period. Let Idrop = 1− IBA be
the dummy variable regarding the college dropout. The wage rate is determined by student’s high
school achievement (H), unobservable characteristic (θ), college selectivity (Isel), drop out (Idrop),
and the demographic characteristics (sex,race). Since there is only one period as a worker and every
worker is at the same age, I do not include the return from potential experience. The coefficient
of Idrop captures the loss of returns from a college degree net of returns from actual labor market
experience.
lnW = Γ0 · Zw + γ1 ln(SAT ) + γ2 ln(AP + 1) + γ3 ln(GPA) + γ4Isel + γ5InonselIdrop + γ6IselIdrop
+ γ6θ + w
, where Zw = {Black,Asian,Hispanic, Female} are the demographic characteristics that affect
the wage rate, and Γ0 = {ΓBlack,ΓAsian,ΓHispanic,ΓFemale} are the corresponding parameters.
Finally, w is the i.i.d. random shock on the wage rate.
4.8 Equilibrium
Let Qsel be the number of seats in selective universities. The college determines the admission
cutoff value h∗ that satisfies
Napplied∑
i=1
I(g(Di)− h∗ > 0) = Qsel.
29Alternatively, I can endogenize the graduation decision, while estimating the utility cost of graduation as a
function of (sex, Isel, θ, lnSAT, lnAP, lnGPA). As long as I assume that the random (preference) shock regarding
the drop out decision is i.i.d., then the implication of the model would not change a lot.
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The cutoff value of admission is determined to equalize the number of seats in selective univer-
sities and the number of admitted students.30
Let Π be the set of structural parameters including the wage rate Γ0. Define X






i} and Y i = {H i, Iisel, IiBA} for each i ∈ N .
Suppose that Π is fixed. Let {Xi, Y i}Ni=1, {M i1}Ni=1 and h∗ constitute an equilibrium if for each


















− UAP (Xi)− Uapply(Xi)
subject to
Ci1(S
′i) + T i(S′i) ≤M i1 + Li(S′i)− tIiprivate
Ci2(S







,where Qsel is the number of seats in selective universities.
31
4.9 Characterization
4.9.1 Family Income and Application for Selective Universities
Suppose that everyone graduates from the college. Denote M s∗2 and Mn∗2 to be the labor market
income when graduating from selective and nonselective universities respectively. For simplicity
of exposition, I abstract from effort choice and private high school attendance decision. Suppose
that the student who attends j ∈ {sel, non} type of college is not borrowing constrained. Then the













30I assume that there is no asymmetric information regarding θ between students and admission committees. Or
it can be considered as (i) colleges have a perfect screening device θˆ to infer θ such that θ = fθ(θˆ) where fθ is a
monotone function, and (ii) g(H, θ) = g(H, f−1θ θ) is known to everyone. Thus, the student can infer her admission
probability correctly.
31Given Π, I can show that the equilibrium cutoff value h∗ is unique. The key assumption is that the wage rate
Γ0 ⊂ Π is fixed. The student at the margin of application has to equalize the marginal benefit of effort choices
regardless of the admission probability to the marginal cost. This pins down the unique cutoff value of h∗ given the
set of structural parameter Π.
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. If the constraint is binding, then C∗∗1 = [1−(1+r)λ]M j∗2 , C∗∗2 =
M1+λM
j∗
2 −T j , and L∗∗ = λM j∗2 . Let V apply be the value of applying for selective universities, and
let V s and V n be the value of attending selective and nonselective universities without including
Uapply. Since the admission is competitive, V
apply = Pad · V s + (1− Pad) · V n. Therefore, applying
for selective universities is optimal iff Pad(V
s − V n) > Uapply. It is straightforward to show the
following.
Proposition. If the borrowing constraint is not binding, it is optimal to apply for selective univer-



















I interpret exp(K) as a relative price of the consumption conditional on the college selectivity.
For instance, exp(K) < 1 would imply that living in a dormitory at a prestigious campus values
more than living in a dormitory at less prestigious universities. There are two reasons why exp(K)
could be larger for the low-income students and why it is more expensive for low-income students
to attend selective universities in terms of the utility. For expositional simplicity, I assume that
there is no effort choice in the following discussion and abstract from characteristic difference in
demographics, preferences, and geographic location of residence. First, exp(K) increases if Uapply
increases, Pad decreases, and Usel decreases. Consider a high-income and a low-income student
who have the same ability measures (A, θ). Usel is not directly affected by family income, thus two
students would have the same nonpecuniary benefit Usel. However, if only the rich student attends
a private high school, two students have different application cost Uapply and the probability of
admission Pad. Thus it is possible that two students make different application decisions because
exp(K) is higher for the low-income student.
Second, suppose that both the high-income and the low-income student attend private high
school and they have the same ability measures (A, θ). In this case, the relative price exp(K) is
same for the rich and the poor student. The above condition can be rewritten as M1(1−exp(K)) >
[T s − exp(K)Tn] − 11+r (M s∗2 − exp(K)Mn∗2 ). It shows that if exp(K) < 1 then the student with
higher M1 would be more likely to apply for selective universities. I will call this as the income
effect associated with the nonpecuniary benefit because sufficiently high nonpecuniary benefit is
necessary to have exp(K) < 1. This effect can be rephrased as follows: if the pecuniary benefit of




2 −exp(K)Mn∗2 )), then only those who already have a lot of money to spend want to attend
selective universities and enjoy the nonpecuniary benefit of prestigious campus life. 32
Proposition. The student decides not to apply for selective universities because of the borrowing
32Note that exp(K) = 1 if I do not consider the nonpecuniary benefit and application cost. Then family income
would not affect the application choice differently by family income if students have the same M2. This is the typical
case discussed in the previous literature such as Cameron and Taber (2004) and Cameron and Heckman (1998).
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1+β . The first condition implies that low income students are
more likely to be constrained. The second inequality of the second condition implies that applying
for selective universities is optimal without borrowing constraints. The first inequality of the second
condition implies that if the cost of not being able to smooth consumption between two periods









, in most cases ∂ln(KK)∂λ =
Ms∗2
M1+λMs∗2 −T s −β
1+r
1−λ(1+r) > 0. Therefore as the
extent of borrowing constraints becomes more stringent (smaller λ) , more constrained students
would change their application decision and make suboptimal application choices.
4.9.2 Tournament Effect
Applying for selective universities increases the marginal benefit of taking additional AP classes
because it can also increase the probability of admission. However, the magnitude would differ by
student’s ability and family income. Also, the admission probability depends on the equilibrium
cutoff value h∗ which depends on the number and the academic quality of the applicant pool.
Therefore, to understand how a tuition subsidy would affect the intensive margin of the choices of
students, the effort choices, I need to understand (i) how the marginal benefit of taking AP classes
changes by student ability and family income for each given h∗, and (ii) how elevated competition
(higher cutoff value h∗∗ > h∗) affects the effort choices of students. Assume that the unit of credits
for AP classes is continuous variable and assume that there is no private high school. Then the
optimal choice NAP satisfies
∂Pad
∂NAP
(V s − V n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+Pad










For students who do not apply for selective universities, the marginal benefit of effort is just
Part (3). Other things being equal, the marginal benefit decreases as family income increases. If I
focus on students who do not apply for selective universities, they would take fewer AP classes than
applicants, and rich students would take fewer AP classes than comparable poor students because
of the income effect.
Part (1) captures how additional AP classes can increase the marginal benefit by increasing
the probability of admission. I will call it the tournament effect. It is positive if taking AP classes
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increases the test score ( ∂H∂NAP > 0) and attending selective universities provides higher value than
attending nonselective universities (V s > V n). However, the magnitude of the tournament effect







for j, k ∈ {SAT,GPA,AP}, Part (1) can be rewritten as
∂Pad
∂NAP


















Part (I) of equation (4.4) increases in ability and family income if students with high ability
(θ,A) learn faster, and attending private high school can increase test scores. Part (II) of equation
(4.4) increases by family income if the pecuniary benefit from attending selective universities is
smaller than the extra cost (T s−Tn > 11+r (M s2 −Mn2 )). Thus, even without borrowing constraints,
expensive tuition can be a reason why low-income students take fewer AP classes and achieve lower
academic test scores. However, Part (II) of equation 4.4 increases in (A, θ) if T s − Tnexp(γ) >
M1(1 − exp(γ)) where γ is the wage premium from attending selective universities. Therefore, it
is an empirical question whether the tournament effect is more sensitive to student ability than to
family income.
Increasing need-based aid from selective universities affects the tournament effect in two ways.
First, for low-incomes students, it directly increases Part (II) of equation (4.4) and reduces the
income effect. Second, it can raise h∗ for everyone if the academic qualification of the low-income
student at the margin of application is higher than that of the least competitive attendee in selective
universities. This, in turn, directly affects Part (I) of equation (4.4) for everyone. Because of the
bell-shape of the normal probability density distribution, increasing h∗ has an asymmetric impact on
high-achieving (g(θ,A) > h∗) and low-achieving (g(θ,A) < h∗) students. It raises the tournament
effect of high-ability students, whereas it has the opposite impact on low-ability students.
On the other hand, changing h∗ may not reduce the achievement gap between rich and poor
students. Increased competition could encourage more aﬄuent students to attend private high
school and to put in more efforts, thus some of less academically able high-income students could
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Figure 1: Increasing Need-Based Aid and the Distribution of the High School Achievement Score
Note. Each graph indicates the distribution of test scores of high- and low-income students. g∗H and g
∗
L are the cutoff
values of academic qualification of applicants from high- and low-income students respectively. If the tournament
effect is more sensitive to ability than to family income, increasing need-based aid can reduce the achievement gap
by raising the achievement of low-income high-ability students (b). If need-based aid attracts many low-ability low-
income students and makes the admission process noisier, the achievement gap can decrease as high-ability students
put less efforts (c). Elevated competition can make more high-income students attend private high school and get
higher test scores, which can widen the achievement gap (d).
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5 Identification
The model has seven structural components. Among them, three components have direct data coun-
terparts: the learning technology H = FH(x;A, θ), the wage rate lnWage = FM (θ,H, Isel, IBA, w),
and the admission probability Pad = Φ(D). The only issue to identify those components is con-
trolling the selection bias driven by θ. I have four components describing individual’s preference:
the utility from consumption (Uc), the nonpecuniary benefit from attending selective universities
(Usel), the utility cost of application (Uapply), and the utility cost of taking AP classes (UAP ). To
identify those preference components, I use the variation in students’ choices: the amount of stu-
dent loan, application decision, the number of AP classes taken by students, and the decision to
attend private high school or not.
To quantify the impact of financial aid, it is essential to control the selection bias driven by
unobservable characteristic that can be positively correlated with family income. As discussed
in Cunha and Heckman (2007), noncognitive skills such as self-control or perseverance can affect
academic achievement and wage. Or when it comes to academic achievement, this characteristic
might capture the time management skill or parents’ guidance. This characteristic seems to have
a strong correlation with family background because high-income students tend to obtain better
educational and economic outcome than observationally equivalent low-income students in data.
To address this issue, I impose a parametric assumption on the distribution of unobservable
ability across individuals, allowing its mean to be affected by student’s family income and parent’s
education. There are two ways to identify parameters associated with the distribution of θ. First, I
use the geographic variations in tuition levels of attending home-state nonselective universities as an
instrumental variable (Figure 3). In particular, I assume the following identification assumptions:
(i) unobservable characteristic θ is not correlated with student’s geographic location of residence
conditional on family income and parents’ educational attainment, (ii) students who do not attend
selective universities attend home-state nonselective universities, (iii) labor market is perfectly
mobile so that the wage rate is determined at the national level and tuition does not directly
affect student’s productivity. Under those assumptions I can compare two groups of students from
two different states with the same observable characteristics. Although I do not observe θ at the
individual level, in aggregate at the state level two groups would have the same expected value of
θ. Because two groups are identical except for the direct cost of attending home-state nonselective
universities, different application behaviors and other choices between two groups are supposed
to be driven by differences in direct cost, not θ. Second, the structural model generates choices
and outcomes of students conditional on all other structural parameters. If I can identify other
parameters from other moment conditions, then the conditional mean of student’s choices and
outcomes can be used to identify the parameters associated with the distribution of θ.
To identify the intertemporal preference in Uc, I use three variables in the data: family in-
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come, labor earning, and the amount of the student’s loan. In the model, all students have the
same intertemporal preference. I identify intertemporal preference from the choices of high-income
students who are not likely to be borrowing constrained. Next, I use the application decision to
identify Usel and Uapply. The model predicts that
Uapply
Pad
− Usel accounts for different application
decision conditional on family income and labor earning. I can separately identify Usel and Uapply,
because Usel is obtained only if the student attends selective universities, whereas all applicants
have to pay Uapply. By comparing applicants with different Pad, I can distinguish Uapply from Usel.
I include the number of selective universities in the student’s home state and the student’s pref-
erence for college characteristics reported in 10th grade in Usel as exclusion restrictions. Finally,
given the learning technology, the number of AP classes taken by the students explains variations
in the utility cost of taking AP classes (UAP ). I control how many AP classes are offered by the
high school for each students to isolate the effect of policy interruption that aims to increase AP
participation by low-income students.
Another challenge is to identify the extent of borrowing constraints in the financial market.
First, borrowing constraints would decrease low-income students’ consumption at college period.
Without the constraint, the model predicts no correlation between family income and the intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of consumption between two periods. The correlation
between family income and the intertemporal MRS could be used to identify the extent of bor-
rowing constraints λ. Second, borrowing constraints can also decrease the application rate of
low-income students. If high ability low-income students did not apply for selective universities
due to borrowing constraints, there are disproportionately more high ability students from low-
income families among nonapplicants. Outcome measures, such as wage rate, and test scores can
be used to determine whether there is a upward selection bias among low-income non-applicants.
6 Method of Simulated Moments
There are three components estimated in the first stage which are taken as given in the structural
estimation: (i) the distribution of grants students could receive when attending selective universities
and nonselective universities conditional on family income and test scores, (ii) the number of AP
classes offered by their high school, (iii) the number of information sources about college application
processes. I assume that those components are exogenous processes from the student’s point of
view. High school type affects those processes, thus students take into account those processes
when they decide whether to attend private high school or not. I assume that everyone has the
same repayment plan: repay the total student loan over the eight years after college graduation
with a fixed interest rate of 7%.33
33The interest rate for an unsubsidized Federal Stafford Loan is 6.8% as of 2015 (6.83% for a PLUS
loan). Although the interest rate of the subsidized loan is 3.4%, since private loan would cost more
25
Given the first stage estimation, I estimate the model with the method of the simulated mo-



















m˜si indicates the simulated moment for individual i in simulation s, whereas mi is directly
computed from the data. For example, I simulate the application decision and effort choices for
each given parameters then compare the model generated moment to the data counterpart. On the
other hand, Z is the set of instrumental variables orthogonal to error components. The moments
are constructed based on the identification argument and orthogonality assumption. I chose the
optimal weight matrix Σˆ constructed based on the sample variance of the moment. There are 79
parameters and 101 moment conditions.
7 Results
Figure 15-20 show the model fit in terms of the number of applicants and attendees in selective
universities, and the number of AP classes students take conditional on their family income and
initial observable ability. The estimated model tracks the observed pattern in data fairly well,
especially the outcome variations across income quintile groups.34 The model slightly understates
the number of AP classes taken by students from the bottom quintile of income distribution. One
potential reason is the impact of policy interruptions regarding AP program participation that
might not be fully captured by controlling the number of AP classes offered by high schools.
7.1 Distribution of Unobservable Ability
Table 29 documents the estimation result of the distribution of unobservable learning ability. The
mean of unobservable ability increases by 0.03 for a unit increase in the log family income and
increases by 0.06 for a unit increase in the log of parents’ educational attainment (φˆ1 = 0.03
and φˆ2 = 0.06). Note that the coefficient of θ in the wage rate is normalized to one so that θ
(http://www.finaid.org/loans/privatestudentloans.phtml), I pick the interest rate for unsubsidized loan. Also, I do
not consider repayment during college education.
34Because data on family income has categorical values, the number of students from the third quintile of income
distribution is larger than other quintile groups.
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increases the log wage rate by one-to-one. On average, students with a family income of $10,000
with college graduated parents get 3.7% higher wage rate than students with a family income of
$50,000 with high school graduated parents, conditional on race, sex, test scores, college selectivity,
and college graduation. The variance of the distribution of θ is estimated to be σˆθ = 0.13, which
is quite sizable. θ also affects test scores, wage rate, admission probability, application cost, and
nonpecuniary benefit.
7.2 The Benefit of Attending Selective Universities
Table 23 shows the estimation result of the wage rate. Attending selective universities increases
0.076 log points of hourly wage rate with 5% significant level. This is after controlling for SAT,
AP score, GPA, and the unobservable characteristic of those students. The model assumes that
the wage premium from attending selective universities is the same for every attendee.35 For a
full time worker who works 2,000 hours per year earns about $2,670 more if she attended selective
universities on average.
Note that students repay the loan over 10 years after college graduation which is actually the
standard plan chosen by majority students. To calculate the life-time pecuniary benefit of attending
selective universities, I calculate the years to make a break-even point for each group. Table 33
shows the result. It takes 13.6 years for students from the top quintile of initial ability and from the
bottom quintile of income distribution, whereas it takes 15.7 years for students with the same initial
ability and from the top quintile of income distribution. This is calculated under the assumption
that the wage premium does not change over time. Thus if the premium also increases over the
life-cycle, the number of years to meet the break-even point would be shorter. The estimation result
in this paper suggests that the pecuniary benefit accounting for expensive tuition is quite moderate.
Interestingly, it takes longer for high-ability students to meet the break-even point than low-ability
students because she has to give up receiving merit-based aid from nonselective universities.
Table 27 shows the estimation result of nonpecuniary benefit of attending selective universities.
Ability measures (A, θ) do not significantly affect the nonpecuniary benefit. Instead, the number
of selective universities in the student’s home state and whether the student values the reputation
of the college are significant factors. This result seems consistent with Fu (2014) which suggests
that students with similar academic achievement scores have very different preferences regarding
different type of colleges.
35Table 19 and Table 20 show the reduced form regression of the wage rate, including the interaction term of family
income and college selectivity. I do not find strong evidence from my sample that the wage premium of attending
selective universities is significantly different by family income.
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7.3 The Extent of Borrowing Constraints
Table 29 shows the estimation result of the extent of liquidity constraint λˆ = 0.76; students cannot
borrow more than 76% of their expected annual income in each year of their college education.
Note that I assume that students take student loans for four years of college education then they
repay the total amount of loan over 10 years. Therefore, λˆ = 0.76 actually implies that students
need to repay 30% of their annual income over 10 years after college education.
Figure 28 shows the estimated loan amount of students conditional on the initial math score (A)
and family income (M1) quintile. It shows that students who attend selective universities take out
more than $10,000 in student loans per year than those who do not attend selective universities.
Also, the amount of the loan substantially decreases by family income. Students from the top
quintile income distribution do not borrow. Among students who attend nonselective universities,
those from the bottom quintile of income distribution borrow more than $10,000 than those from the
second highest quintile of income distribution. The corresponding number for students who attend
selective universities is $8,000. The model assumption that students’ borrowing limit depends only
on their future earning, not family income, may not be too misleading, because rich students need
loans of smaller amounts compared to academically similar poor students. Figure 22 shows the
loan to expected income ratio the model predicts of students from the top and bottom quintile
of income distribution. It suggests that a lot more students from low-income family borrow very
close to the amount of borrowing limits. This result suggests that even after taking into account
generous financial aid, difficulty in financing college cost can be an important problem for low-
income students.
8 Counterfactual Analysis
First, I discuss the impact of borrowing constraints on the choices of low- and high-income high
school students. Second, I discuss the quantitative importance of students’ initial characteristics
to explain the choice differences between low- and high-income students. Third, I discuss the
respective roles of features of selective universities on the choice difference between rich and poor
students. Fourth, I discuss the impact of doubling need-based aid from selective universities for
attendees from the bottom quintile of distribution on the choices of students, the achievement gap,
and aggregate effort level. Finally, I compare the impact of increasing need-based aid from selective
universities to alternative policies such as merit-based aid, changes in the admission criteria (the
Texas Top Ten Law), increasing need-based aid from nonselective universities, and income-based
affirmative action (income quota). In doing so, I simulate the model over 100 times so that under
the new cut-off value of the admission criteria the number of attendees is equalized to the number
of seats in selective universities on average.
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8.1 The Impact of Borrowing Constraints on Students’ Choices
Table 36 and 37 summarize the impact of borrowing constraints on the choice and outcome of low-
income students and the gap between rich and poor students. The impact of borrowing constraints
on high ability, low-income students is substantial. First, borrowing constraints decreases the
number of low-income applicants by 6.9%. Focusing on students within the top quintile of initial
test score distribution, borrowing constraints increase the effort gap by 14.0%, the achievement gap
by 8.4%, and the wage gap by 4.7%. If the financial aid from selective universities were randomly
allocated across attendees, it could have increased the effort gap by 22%, the gap in the number
of applicants by 3%, the gap in SAT score by 13%, and the gap in wage rate by 7%. Therefore,
need-based aid from selective universities play an important role in reducing effort gap, but still
there are constrained low-income high ability students.
8.2 Students’ Initial Characteristics and Choice Difference between Rich and
Poor Students
Students are mainly differentiated by their initial math score (A), unobservable ability (θ), and
family income (M1). How much students’ ability measures (A, θ) explain the different choices of
low- and high-income students would show the upper bound of the impact of need-based aid from se-
lective universities. To quantify the respective roles of students’ initial characteristics in explaining
the choice difference between the rich and poor students, I consider the following counterfactual.
I divide the initial characteristics into four parts: (i) characteristics except initial math score,
unobservable ability, and family income (Z), (ii) initial math score (A), (iii) unobservable ability
(θ), and (iv) family income. I consider two representative students from the bottom and the top
quintile of income distribution. I examine how the choices of students from the top quintile of
income distribution change if I substitute one type of initial characteristic with that of a student
from the bottom quintile of income distribution.
Table 38 and Figure 27 summarize results. The number (percent) indicates to what extent
the model can explain the different choices of rich and poor students based on the true estimated
parameters, if one characteristic of rich students were the same as that of poor students. First,
the difference in the initial math score is the most important indication that why rich students
take more AP classes and apply more often for selective universities than their poor counterparts.
It explains 65.9% of the gap in the number of AP classes, 57.7% of the gap in the probability of
attending private high school, and 37.4% of the gap in the application rate. Second, the decision
whether to attend a private high school is most sensitive to family income (63.1%), whereas the
number of AP classes is least sensitive to the income difference (35.8%). Finally, the number of
AP classes students take change very sensitively to all of (A, θ,M), whereas the application rate
is least sensitive to changes in each type of characteristics. This might suggest that those initial
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characteristics are a substitute for AP class taking, but they act as a complement when it comes
to the application decision.
8.3 Selective Universities and Choices of Students
Selective universities have several features that can affect students’ choices: pecuniary/nonpecuniary
benefit, application cost, a competitive admission process based on test scores, need-based finan-
cial aid, and expensive tuition. Table 40 shows how the choice difference between rich and poor
students (the top and bottom quintile of income distribution) changes if I change a certain feature
of selective universities to a counterfactual one.
First, the nonpecuniary benefit and test-based competition in the admission process are two of
the most relevant features. If the admission process becomes random, the number of AP classes
taken by students from the bottom (top) quintile of income quintile decreases by 87% (96%).
A similar result would hold were it not for the nonpecuniary benefit from attending selective
universities. However, the nonpecuniary benefit is not sufficient to motivate students to take
advanced classes if the test score is not valued in the admissions process. Second, if the tuition
of selective universities were the same as that of nonselective universities, the difference in the
application rate between rich and poor students would have decreased by 12%. A reduced tuition
would increase the number of applications of poor students by 15% and decrease the number of
applications of high-income students by 4%. This suggests that some of the less academically able
high-income students benefit from the expensive tuition of selective universities. Finally, if the
financial aid from selective universities were to be granted on a random basis, it would increase the
effort difference between rich and poor students by 5%.
Figure 23 and Figure 24 show how student’s effort level changes as the admission probability
among applicants decreases as the capacity in selective universities decreases. The tournament
effect—additional effort applicants put to increase admission probability—increases as it becomes
more difficult to get an admission from selective universities. The average effort level shows a non-
monotonic relationship with the admission probability because if the capacity is too small, more
students are discouraged from applying for selective universities.
Figure 25 and Figure 26 describe how student’s own characteristics and environmental factors
such as tuition and test-based admission process account for the choice difference between rich and
poor students. In this counterfactual analysis, I consider two students from the top and bottom in-
come distribution and have the same population average observable characteristics except for family
income. In the baseline, I assume that tuition is free, the admission process is random, there is
borrowing constraints, and no heterogeneity in the unobservable characteristic θ. Even in this case,
high-income students would apply more for selective universities because they can afford private
high school which reduces application costs. Current tuition does not affect application behavior
of high-income students, while it reduces the application rate of low-income students slightly. Test-
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based competition reduces the application rate of high-income students by 9% because it requires
extra efforts for higher admission probability and making additional effort is costly. Introducing
borrowing constraints widens the gap in application rate by 3%, whereas heterogeneity in θ fur-
ther increases the gap by 6%. This suggests that although borrowing constraints contribute to the
different application behavior between rich and poor students, heterogeneity in the unobservable
characteristic θ is quantitatively more important to explain the disparity. Figure 26 shows the
similar patterns for the effort gap between rich and poor students. Test-based competition in the
admission process is important to make high-income students put more efforts. Similar to the ap-
plication rate, heterogeneous θ is quantitatively much more important than borrowing constraints
to explain the effort gap between rich and poor students. This analysis suggests that increasing
need-based aid could decrease the achievement gap because it can relax borrowing constraints,
however, its impact would be limited because the unobservable characteristic plays an important
role in shaping student’s behaviors.
8.4 Increasing Need-Based Aid from Selective Universities
If selective universities double the amount of grants per attending student from the bottom quin-
tile of the income distribution, the average effort level of those low-income high school students
increases by 13.4%. the effort gap decreases by 33.4%, the achievement gap by 20.2%, and the
wage gap by 10.2% of students with initial test scores in top 20th percentile in 10th grade. The
aggregate achievement score also increases because elevated competition raises the effort level of
high ability applicants from all income backgrounds. It increases the aggregate effort level by 0.7%.
Elevated competition increases the effort level of high ability students from all income background.
In particular, the effort level of low-income applicants increases by 2.6% and the effort level of appli-
cants from other income backgrounds by 0.5%. Focusing on those who actually increase the effort
level, low-income students increases by 52% and high-income students increase by 12%. Because
low-income high-ability students respond more sensitively to the change, doubling need-based aid
can reduce the achievement gap.
Increasing need-based aid can also increase the application rate of students from the bottom
quintile income distribution by 14.1%. Among those low-income students who changed their ap-
plication decision, 53% attend selective universities. Relaxing borrowing contraints explain half of
the increase in the application rate of low-income students. The remaining half is explained by the
income effect—because the pecuniary benefit is too small to compensate for the expensive tuition,
only those who already have a lot of money to spend want to attend selective universities and
obtain the nonpecuniary benefit.
Table 39 shows how elevated competition affects the effort choice of students conditional on
family income and initial math score. In this exercise, I decrease the average admission probability
by 2% by increasing the cutoff value in the admission criteria (h∗). This is the case when the number
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of applicants increases without a change in the academic qualification of the applicant pool. The
effort reduction is much larger for students with a low math score (8%) compared to students with
a high math score (0.9%). When I compare the elasticity conditional on students’ initial math
scores, there is no significant difference by family income. This shows that elevated competition
has an asymmetric impact on high and low ability students, and family income cannot counteract
this effect. Because only talented low-income students would change their application decision,
increased need-based aid from selective universities would also improve the academic quality of
applicants. This would strengthen the asymmetric impact of elevated competition by students’
initial math score.
By promoting competition, increasing need-based aid makes selective universities can become
more selective in terms of students’ initial academic achievement compared to their family income.
This implies that not only talented high school students have a better opportunity for attending
selective universities but also it can increase the aggregate achievement level by raising effort choices
of high ability applicants from all income background.
8.5 Alternative Policies
I compare a couple of policies in terms of their impacts on low-income student’s academic achieve-
ment. First, doubling need-based aid can close the achievement gap better than merit-based aid,
while keeping the aggregate achievement level as almost the same. Second, changing admission
criteria similar to the Texas Top 10 Law, using GPA only to determine the admission result, is
much more effective to reduce the achievement gap than doubling need-based aid from selective
universities. However, the Texas Top 10 Law decreases the overall effort level of students by half,
which corresponds to a 33 point reduction in SAT the score. This suggests the importance of
student’s effort choice to evaluate the impact of college admission criteria on the aggregate achieve-
ment level. Third, increasing need-based aid from selective universities is more effective per dollar
than the same policy implemented from nonselective universities. This is because need-based aid
from selective universities targets high-ability low-income students whose effort choices would be
the most elastic to tuition subsidies. By targeting those students, increasing need-based aid from
selective universities can be much more effective per dollar than other policy that target all low-
income students. Table 42 and 43 summarize the outcomes of low-income students and the gap
in outcome between students from the top and the bottom quintile of income distribution under
different counterfactual experiments.
8.5.1 Merit-Based Aid
Selective universities have awarded financial aid mostly based on student’s need. However, recently,
more selective universities started to award aid for middle- and high-income students by redefining
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need-based aid or increasing merit-based aid. Because merit-based aid is more frequently discussed
as a way of providing incentives to students for higher academic achievement, comparing the impact
of need-based aid from merit-based aid can be informative to understand the incentive aspect of
need-based aid from selective universities.
I consider the counterfactual financial aid policy such that selective universities provide only
merit-based aid. I use the merit-based aid component from nonselective universities as a benchmark
to determine how aid is awarded based on student’s test scores. Also, I keep the budget spending
on merit-based aid as the same as the budget required to doulbe need-based aid.
The result suggests that doubling need-based aid can close the achievement gap better than
merit-based aid by 21.1% among high-ability students. The aggregate achievement level is higher
under merit-based aid case but the difference is less than 1%. Merit-based aid increases the effort
level of low-income high-ability students by 1.5%, whereas doubling need-based aid can increases
the effort level of low-income high-ability students by 11.3%. Merit-based aid increases the effort
level of high-income high-ability students by 1.1%. As a result, merit-based aid results in 33.4%
larger effort gap and 10.7% larger wage gap between rich and poor students with high initial ability
compared to doubling need-based aid.
8.5.2 The Texas Top 10 Law
As an alternative to the race-based affirmative action in the college admission process in 1997
Texas introduced the Texas Top 10 Law. This law guaranteed an automatic admission to flagship
universities in Texas for students who ranked in the top 10% of their classes in a Texas high school.
Motivated by this policy change, I evaluate the impact of making admission criteria similar to the
Texas Top 10 Law such that only the GPA is taken into account in the admission process. This
change does not need extra resources to implement.
The Texas Top 10 Law can substantially reduce the achievement gap among students in the top
quintile of the initial test scores, as measured by SAT scores, by 39.5%. However, the aggregate
effort level decreases by 49.2%, which corresponds to a 33 point reduction in the average SAT score
and $1,300 dollar decrease in annual average income of low-income high-ability students. Because
taking AP classes is less effective in obtaining higher GPA, even high ability students take many
fewer AP classes during high school. This highlights the importance of students’ effort choices
when it comes to evaluating changing college admission criteria.
8.5.3 Increasing Need-Based Aid from Nonselective Universities
I consider the case in which nonselective universities raise need-based aid by $12,000 for students
from the bottom quintile of income distribution. This decreases the number of low-income ap-
plicants by 7% and the number of AP classes low-income students take by 11%. Focusing on
33
low-income students within the 20th percentile of initial test score distribution, increasing need-
based aid from nonselective universities decreases the number of applicants by 6% and the number
of AP classes taken by students by 8%. It also increases the effort gap between rich and poor
students with top quintile distribution of the initial ability by 24%, the gap in the SAT score by
15%, the gap in wage rate by 7%. Although this policy might target students at the margin of
college attainment decision, it could have unintended results on high ability low-income students
by leading them to apply less frequently to selective universities.
8.5.4 Income Quota
As an alternative to race-based affirmative action in the college admission process, income-based
affirmative action is often discussed.36 Motivated by these discussions, I consider following the
counterfactual experiment; the income quota system. The system gives additional points to the
lowest income quintile students in the admission process so that the number of lowest income
quintile students doubles.
Table 42-43 suggest that the income-based affirmative action, the income quota system, can
increase the number of low-income applicants by 59%. However, students with low initial test score
respond more sensitively such that the number of low-income high ability applicants increases
by 27%. It also increase the number of AP classes taken by low-income by 14%, but it slightly
reduces the effort level of low-income high ability students. The gap between rich and poor students
decreased more than increasing need-based aid from selective universities. For example, it decreases
the effort gap by 7%, the gap in the number of applicants by the 12%, the gap in SAT score by
20%, the wage gap by 23%. Similar to the Texas Top 10 Law, income quota system would be more
effective to reduce the achievement gap between rich and poor students, but it comes with a large
reduction in the aggregate achievement level.
8.5.5 Providing More AP Classes
There has been increasing policy interests in expanding AP program to low-income students. To
compare its impact with increasing need based financial aid from selective universities, I consider
the following counterfactual. First, I compute the total budget required to implement increasing
need based financial aid from selective universities. Then, based on the estimated start up cost
for average AP class documented by College Board 37, I compute how many AP classes can be
newly offered by high schools in which students from lowest income quintile family attend. It
turns out that with the budget required to increase financial aid for lowest income quintile students
who attend selective universities, 1.70 AP classes can be offered to every student from the bottom
quintile of income distribution.
36http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/04/27/should-affirmative-action-be-based-on-income
374,343 dollar per 25 size class
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First, low-income high-ability students take 6% more AP classes if more AP classes are offered
by the high school. It does not affect choices of students from other income quintile groups. Second,
it is less effective compared to doubling need-based aid from selective universities in increasing the
effort level of low-income students. This is because expanding AP classes targets all low-income
students, whereas need-based aid from selective universities focuses on low-income high-ability.
9 Out-Of-Sample Prediction
To examine the validity of the structural model, I consider an out-of-sample prediction. The
National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 is a nationally representative sample of 8th graders.
It has four follow-up surveys in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000. The ELS2002 and the NELS1988 have
almost identical survey instruments. Assuming that changes in financial aid policy from selective
universities are exogenous from students’ points of view, I consider the following exercise. First,
I estimate the financial aid policy from selective universities in the NELS1988 sample. Second,
I substitute the financial aid policy of the ELS2002 cohort with that of the NELS1988 cohort.
Based on the estimated structural model and by using the data of the ELS2002, I can predict
students’ application decisions, admission results conditional on family income, and initial math
scores. Third, I look at the raw data of the NELS1988 and calculate the joint distribution of family
income, the initial math score, the application, and the admission result. Then I compare how
closely the predicted outcome tracks the actual data observed in the earlier cohort, the NELS1988.
Figure 29-30 show the result of the out-of-sample prediction. Because the aggregate application
rate increased from 18% to 42% during this period, I focus on the composition rates of applicants
and attendees in selective universities conditional on family income and initial ability rather than
focusing on the application and admission rate of each group. Also, I do not consider the number of
AP classes taken by students because the number of AP classes offered by the high school increased
drastically during this period.
The estimated model predicts the NELS1988 data fairly well in terms of the composition rate
in selective universities by family income quintile. The disparity between the predicted model
and the NELS1988 data is less than 3% for each income quintile group. However, the model
predicts much smaller disparity between students with high- and low-ability. In particular, the
data shows a stark difference in the composition rates between students from the first and the
second highest quintile of initial ability distribution. A more difficult application process and a
much lower number of available AP classes in the NELS1988 cohort may explain why the selection




In this paper, I examine whether increasing need-based aid from selective universities can reduce
the achievement gap between rich and poor students conditional on the initial ability. I find that
although low-income students receive more than twice the amount of aid from selective universities
as high-income students, borrowing constraints bind for low-income high ability students. These
constraints lead to an increasing achievement gap between rich and poor students with the same
initial ability. Additional need-based aid from selective universities for low-income students can not
only reduce the achievement gap between rich and poor, but also increase the achievement level
of all high-ability students. I find that need-based aid can close the achievement gap better than
merit-based aid, while keeping the aggregate achievement level of the entire population almost the
same.
Important things remain for future studies. First, this paper does not model problems from the
perspective of the colleges. However, competition between two selective universities would be an
important reason for selective universities to change their financial aid policies. Thus, incorporating
competition between colleges could be a valuable extension. Second, this paper does not distinguish
between different types of loans. However, the cost of financing varies substantially according to
whether or not it is supplied by a private loan and according to the type of Federal loan. Therefore,
further study of those features would provide relevant policy implications. Finally, incorporating
job search capability, college major, and occupational sorting would be another relevant extension,
because the benefit of attending selective universities and taking more advanced classes may depend
on those margins as well.
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Figure 2: SAT Score Distribution of Low- and High-Income Students within the Top
20th Initial Ability
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). The graph shows the distribution of
SAT score of low- and high-income students who belong to the top 20th percentile of the initial ability distribution.
The low- and high-income students refer to students from the bottom and top income distribution. Initial ability is
measured by the standardized math test score in 10th grade.
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Figure 3: Total Direct Cost of Attending Nonselective Universities in Home States for
Four Years
Note. Data comes from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 2004. The total cost includes tu-
ition/fees and the cost for room, board, and book. Regarding the cost of room and board, I use the cost of living in
campus instead of the cots of living with family.
Figure 4: Total Direct Cost of Attending Selective Universities in Out-of-Home States
for Four Years
Note. Data comes from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 2004 (IPEDS 2004). The total cost
includes tuition/fees and the cost for room, board, and book. Regarding the cost of room and board, I use the cost
of living in campus.
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Figure 5: Composition Rate of Attendees and Applicants in Selective Universities By
Income Quintiles
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002) and NCES-Barron’s Admission Com-
petitive Index 2004. It is the proportion (expressed in percent) of attendees (applicants) from each quintile of income
distribution among all attendees (applicants) in selective universities.
Figure 8: Attendance Rate, Application Rate, and Admission Rate upon Application
(a) All Students (b) High-Achieving Students with Top 20th Initial
Ability
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). The unit is percent. Figure 9(a) is
based on the entire sample, and Figure 9(b) is based on high-achieving students who belongs to top 20 math score
at the sophomore year of the high school. Attendance rate (application probability) is the ratio of the number of
students who attend (apply for) selective universities to the number of all students conditional on income quintile.
Admission rate is the ratio of the number of attendees to the number of applicants for each income quintile group.
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Figure 9: Number of AP Classes Taken by Applicants and Nonapplicants
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). I plot the 20th, 50th, and 80th
percentile of the distribution of the number of AP classes taken by applicants and non-applicants. The median
number of AP classes taken by applicants is more than three times larger than that of nonapplicants.
Figure 10: Average Grants Given to Attendees by Family Income
Note. Data comes from the IPEDS of 2012-2013 academic year. The unit is 2012 dollar. The total grant includes
the Federal grants, state grants, and institutional grants. The income categorization follows that of IPEDS data.
Selective universities are four-year colleges in the U.S. that belong to the top two categories of the Barron’s Index
2004, whereas nonselective universities account for the rest of the U.S. four-year colleges. I use the IPEDS of 2012-
2013 academic year because the IPEDS of 2002-2003 academic year does not have such information, the amount of
average grant given to students reported by each institution.
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Figure 11: Trend in the Amount of the Institutional Grants Per Student from Selective and Nonse-
lective Universities
Note. Data comes from the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) 2000-2012. I report the average
amount of grants offered by the institution the student attends. The unit is 2004 Dollar. Selective universities are
4-year colleges with top 2 categories of NCES-Barron’s Admission Competitive Index, which account for about 20%
of entire enrollees of 4-year colleges.
Figure 12: Trend in the Amount of the Average Federal Grants
Note. Data comes from the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) 2000-2012. The unit is 2004 Dol-
lar. Federal grants includes Pell Grants, Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants (FSEOG), Teacher
Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) Grants, Iraq and Afghanistan Service Grants.
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Figure 13: Number of AP Classes offered by High School of Those Who Do Not Take AP Classes
Note. Data comes from the High School Transcript of the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). The
first income quintile indicates the bottom quintile of income distribution. Focusing on students who do not take AP
classes, this graph shows the number of AP classes offered by high school in which those students attend.
Figure 14: Number of AP Classes offered by High School and Number of AP Classes Taken By Students
Note. Data comes from the High School Transcript of the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). I focus
on students who take at least one AP Class. The graph shows the number of AP classes offered by high school in
which those students attend. The first income quintile indicates the bottom quintile of income distribution.
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Motivation (Tables)
Table 1: Achievement Gap conditional on Initial Test Scores
Variable lnSAT lnSAT
Black -0.082*** (0.008) -0.077*** (0.007)
Asian 0.047*** (0.007) -0.011* (0.006)
Hispanic -0.036*** (0.008) -0.056*** (0.007)
Female -0.005 (0.004) -0.014*** (0.004)
ln(A) 0.092*** (0.002) 0.073*** (0.002)
lnfincome 0.037*** (0.003) 0.026*** (0.002)
ln(APclass+1) 0.096*** (0.003)
Const 6.243*** (0.031) 6.374*** (0.028)
Num Obs. 4,080 4,080
R-square 0.385 0.523
Note. The sample consists of students who attend four-year colleges. This is the OLS estimation for the log
SAT score (sum of verbal and math SAT score). ‘ln(A)’ indicates the standardized math score in grade 10th.
‘lnfincome’ indicates the log of family income. Since almost half of students did not take AP tests, I use ln(AP+1)
instead of ln(AP ). Standard errors are in the parentheses. Without student’s own effort choice, as measured by
the number of AP classes, the R-square decreases by 28%.
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Table 2: Log Hourly Wage I
Parameter (1) (2) (3)
Black -0.079** -0.081** -0.029
Asian -0.007 -0.013 -0.007
Hispanic 0.022 0.016 0.039
Female -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.065***
ln(A) 0.020* 0.020* 0.003
lnfincome 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.078***
lnMomEdu -0.013 -0.024 -0.053
lnDadEdu -0.059 -0.070 -0.095*
ln(APclass+1) 0.069*** 0.057*** 0.026
ln(A) 0.083 0.074 0.046
Motivation 0.019* 0.020* 0.023*





Constant 1.912*** 2.016*** 0.361
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a OLS estimation of the log
of the hourly wage rate on students’ demographic, family background, initial math score (ln(A)), and curriculum
choice (lnUNITMath: log of the number of total math credit (Carnegie unit), and lnAPclass: log number of
AP classes students take), college selectivity (DummySel), and other traits such as Action Control measure, and
Motivation measure (that measures how much the student values monetary return in the future).
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Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a OLS estimation of the
log of hourly wage rate. I further control major choice, college dropout, and whether to attend graduate school
or not. ‘PEdu’ indicates the average years of schooling of parents. ‘Dropout BA’ indicates whether the student
drops out of college, whereas ‘Graduate School’ indicates whether the student attends graduate schools.
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Table 4: Log Hourly Wage III - NLSY79
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4)
Black 0.021 0.021 0.030 0.063
Hispanic 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.110*** 0.116***
Female -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.0004 -0.001
Highest Grade Completed 0.036*** -0.001 -0.002
Age 0.049*** -0.086
Age Square -0.00044*** -0.0001
AFQT -0.85e-06*** -3.54e-07 -0.000013***
AFQT×Age 3.40e-07*** 1.06e-07*** 3.85e-07***
lnSAT -0.0007** 0.63***
lnSAT ×Age 0.000041*** -0.00083
Constant 5.933*** 4.781*** 6.305*** 2.580***
R-square 0.1930 0.2070 0.2321 0.2300
Note. Data comes from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). This is a pooling OLS
estimation of the log hourly. I divide the annual income by the annual working hours to get the hourly wage rate.
Column (4) suggests that even after controlling for the AFQT score and its interaction with the age, the SAT
score still has a significantly positive correlation with the hourly wage rate. However, the SAT score does not
have significant age effects on the wage rate after controlling for the AFQT score and its interaction with the age.
Table 5: Different Effort Measures and SAT Scores
(1) (2) (3)
Black -44.72*** -43.08*** -42.68***
Asian -17.15*** 22.08*** 29.97***
Hispanic -39.94*** -17.15** -14.72*
Female -0.90 3.40 8.14*
ln(family income) 6.72** 10.68*** 10.56***
ln(Parent’s education) 138.35*** 185.24*** 195.60***
ln(Initial Score) 112.45*** 132.51*** 134.85***
public -34.01*** -20.44*** -23.51***
Unit Math 5.31** 13.56*** 13.98***
Unit English -1.04 1.81 1.11
Extracurricular -0.31 -0.27 0.04
Homework 0.82*** 2.48***
AP class 26.57***
Const 172.67*** -115.30** -130.07***
R-square 0.603 0.523 0.517
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). The dependent variable is the
sum of math and verbal SAT score. I consider 5 types of effort choices. ’Unit Math’ and ’Unit English’ are
the Carnegie units of the total math and English classes students take during high school. ’Extracurricular’ is
the average weekly hours students spend on extracurricular activities. ’Homework’ is the average weekly hours
spending on homework. ’AP class’ is the number of total AP/IB classes students take during high school. Once I
take into account the number of AP classes, the coefficient of math classes and that of homework hours decreased
almost by 60%.
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Table 6: Student Composition in Selective Universities
All Students Top 20 Math Scores
Attendees Applicants Attendees Applicants
1st Income Quintile 8.4 10.3 8.7 8.1
2nd Income Quintile 10.0 12.2 7.9 8.8
3th Income Quintile 19.9 21.2 19.5 20.8
4th Income Quintile 19.1 18.3 21.1 20.0
5th Income Quintile 42.6 38.0 42.9 42.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002. The unit is percent. It is the composition
rate of students from each quintile of income distribution. High-achieving students are those with top 20 math
score in the sophomore year of the high school. Selective universities are 4-year colleges with top 2 categories of
Barron’s Admission Competitive Index, which account for about 20% of entire enrollees of 4-year colleges.
Table 7: Admission and Application Probability
All (1) (2) (3)
Income Quintile Admitted/All Applied/All Admitted/Applied
1st Quintile 12.0 28.9 41.6
2nd Quintile 13.2 31.5 41.9
3th Quintile 17.6 36.5 48.1
4th Quintile 20.7 38.8 53.4
5th Quintile 31.2 54.5 57.2
Top 20th Ability (1) (2) (3)
Income Quintile Admitted/All Applied/All Admitted/Applied
1st Quintile 38.3 56.7 67.6
2nd Quintile 25.0 44.0 56.8
3th Quintile 34.2 57.2 60.0
4th Quintile 42.1 63.2 66.7
5th Quintile 45.2 70.2 64.4
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). The unit is percent. (1): atten-
dance rate, (2): application rate, and (3): admission probability. Attendance (Application) rate is obtained by
dividing the number of attendees (applicants) of selective universities by the number of students (four-year college
attendees) in each quintile of income distribution. Admission probability is obtained by dividing the number of
attendees by the number of applicants from each quintile of income distribution. Selective universities are 4-year
colleges with top two categories of Barron’s Admission Competitive Index, which account for about 20% of entire
enrollees of 4-year colleges.
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Table 8: Average Tuition by College Selectivity
Selectivity (1) Tuition (2) Tuition (3) Room and Book (1) + (3)
(Out of State) (In State)
Barron 1 26,911(7,671) 25,461 (9,814) 9,301 (2,130) 34,762
Barron 2 23,460(7,093) 20,976 (10,002) 8,476 (1,747) 29,452
Barron 3 18,564(5,198) 16,119 (7,677) 7,653 (1,489) 23,772
Barron 4 14,817(4,194) 12,025 (6,599) 7,079 (1,550) 19,105
Barron 5 13,040(3,917) 10,415 (5,940) 6,901 (1,527) 17,316
Barron 6 9,994(3,787) 7,097 (4,534) 5,902 (1,455) 12,999
Barron 7 17,160(6,517) 16,622 (7,130) 9,025 (2,164) 25,648
Selective 24,824(7,497) 22,749 (10,140) 12,492 (7,131) 35,241
Nonselective 15,061(5,098) 12,492 (7,131) 7,180 (1,651) 22,241
Note. Data comes from the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (2004) and Barron’s Admission Compet-
itive Index (2004). Units is 2004 Dollar. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 9: Grants as Proportion of Tuition
Selective Nonselective
All More than half All More than half
Black 1.128*** 0.812*** 1.01 -0.115
Asian 1.037*** 0.557*** -0.069 -0.117
Hispanic 1.083*** 0.785*** 0.783* 0.640*
lnfincome -0.357*** -0.285*** -0.240 -0.652***
lnParEdu -0.553 -0.247 -1.219 0.118
lnSAT 0.932** 0.721* 0.551 1.501
lnGPA 1.230*** 0.738** 1.375 -0.012
lnAPscore 0.230* 0.114 0.040 0.210
lnAPclass 0.017 -0.008 0.250 -0.143
Constant -3.573 -2.713 -1.249 -4.261
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a multiple probit estimation
regarding the fraction of financial aid a student gets out of total tuition. The baseline outcome is getting less
than half of tuition as aid. I estimated separately by college selectivity, thus it does not include information on
the financial aid offered by other colleges than the student attended.
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Table 10: Changes in Financial Aid Policy of Top Universities (I)
University Description Family Income Year
Brown
Caps loan at $7,000 (4 year) Less than $30,000 1999-2000
Caps loan at $11,500 (4 year) Less than $50,000 1999-2000
No loan in financial aid package Less than $100,000 2008-2009
Limit 4 year debt to $12,000 $100,000 to $125,000 2008-2009
Limit 4 year debt to $16,000 $125,000 to $150,000 2008-2009
Limit 4 year debt to $20,000 More than $150,000 2008-2009
No parental contribution Less than $60,000 2008-2009
Columbia
Replace loans with grants Less than $50,000 2007-2008
Replace loans with grants All Columbia College/SEAS 2008-2009
No parent contribution Less than $60,000 2008-2009
Reduced parent contribution $60,000 to $100,000 2008-2009
Cornell
Replace loans with grants Less than $60,000 2008-2009
Caps need based loans at $3,000 $60,000 to $120,000 2008-2009
Replace loans with grants Less than $75,000 2009-2010
No parental contribution $60,000 to $100,000 2009-2010
Caps need based loans at $3,000 $75,000 to $120,000 2009-2010
Replace loans with grants less than $60,000 2013-2014
No parental contribution less than $60,000 2013-2014
Caps need based loans at $2,500 $60,000 to $75,000 2013-2014
Caps need based loans at $5,000 $75,000 to $120,000 2013-2014
Caps need based loans at $7,500 More than $120,000 2013-2014
Dartmouth College
No loan in financial aid package All 2008-2009
Free tuition less than $75,000 2008-2009
Free tuition with no loan less than $75,000 2011-2012
Caps on annual loan ($2,500 to $5,500) $75,000 to $200,000 2011-2012
Free tuition with no loan Less than $100,000 2012-2013
Caps on annual loan ($2,500 to $5,500) $100,000 to $200,000 2012-2013
Harvard
No parent contribution Less than $40,000 2004-2005
No parent contribution Less than $40,000 2006-2007
Replace loans with grants All 2008-2009
Zero to 10 Percent Standard
at most 10% of their income $120,000 to $180,000 2008-2009
at most 0% to 10% of Income $60,000 to $120,000 2008-2009
0% Less $60,000 2008-2009
Note. Data come from http://www.finaid.org/questions/noloansforlowincome.phtml
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Table 11: Changes in Financial Aid Policy of Top Universities (II)
University Description Family Income Year
Princeton
Replace loan with grants low income family 1998-1999
Replace loan with grant All with financial aid 2001-2002
Yale
No parent contribution less than $45,000 2005-2006
Reduce parent contribution $45,000 to $60,000 2005-2006
Replace loan with grants All students 2008-2009
No parent contribution less than $60,000 2008-2009
Limit parent contribution (1 to 10%) $60,000 to $120,000 2008-2009
Limit parent contribution (10%) $120,000 to $200,000 2008-2009
Increase grants child in college≥ 2 2008-2009
Replace loans with grants All students 2010-2011
No parent contribution Less than $65,000 2010-2011
Limit parent contribution (1 to 10%) $65,000 to $130,000 2010-2011
Stanford No parent contribution Less than $45,000 2006-2007
Replace loan with grants All Families 2008-2009
($4,500 contribution by earning from work)
No parent contribution, Less than $60,000 2008-2009
No tuition/room/board
No tuition Less than $100,000 2008-2009
University of Pennsylvania No loan in financial aid package Less than $50,000 2006-2007
No loan in financial aid package Less than $60,000 2007-2008
No loan in financial aid package Less than $100,000 2008-2009
No loan in financial aid package All 2009-2010
Note. Data comes from http://www.finaid.org/questions/noloansforlowincome.phtml
Table 12: Recent Changes in Merit-Based Aid
Colleges Ave Merit-Aid Change from 2007-8
Stanford Univ. $5,085 31%
Vanderbilt Univ. $24,505 78%
Boston Univ. $19,960 39%
Carnegie Mellon Univ. $8,293 -20%
Univ. of Chicago $11,636 -19%
Washington Univ. in St. Louis $8,803 -13%
George Washington Univ. $18,495 -9%
Note. Data comes from
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/08/education/edlife/8edlife chart.html
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Table 13: Test Scores and AP Classes
Parameter lnSAT lnGPA lnAPscore
Black -0.049*** -0.097*** -0.004
Asian -0.016*** -0.017** -0.002
Hispanic -0.030*** -0.053*** 0.007
Female -0.002 0.069*** 0.012
ln(A) 0.112*** 0.070*** 0.060***
lnfincome 0.010*** -0.015*** 0.044***
lnParEdu 0.132*** 0.013 0.185***
lnAPclass 0.066*** 0.054*** 0.570***
lnUNITMath 0.031*** 0.103*** -0.025
Constant 5.993 0.817*** -1.145***
Note. Data come from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a OLS estimation of
log test scores on students’ demographic, family background, initial math score (ln(A)), and curriculum choice
(lnUNITMath: log of the number of total math credit (Carnegie unit), and lnAPclass: log number of AP classes
students take).
Table 14: College Drop Out
Parameter Estimates Marginal Effect
Specification (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Black 0.320*** 0.325*** 0.080 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.023
Asian 0.063 0.094 0.071 0.021 0.028 0.021
Hispanic -0.051 -0.037 -0.140 -0.017 -0.011 -0.041
Female -0.014 -0.020 0.035 -0.006 -0.006 0.010
lnMath -0.127*** -0.134*** -0.057 -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.016
lnfincome -0.165*** -0.154*** -0.160*** -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.046***
lnMomEdu -0.301 -0.276 -0.186 -0.091 -0.083 -0.054
lnDadEdu -0.303* -0.263 -0.187 -0.089* -0.079 -0.054
lnAPclass -0.206*** -0.167*** 0.014 -0.062*** -0.050*** 0.004
lnUNITMath -0.463*** -0.436*** -0.287* -0.138*** -0.130*** -0.083*
Motivation -0.023 -0.024 -0.037 -0.016 -0.007 -0.011
ActionControl -0.049 -0.047 0.004 -0.006 -0.014 0.001




Constant 4.174*** 3.875*** 8.266***
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a probit estimation of the
college drop out decision on students’ demographic, family income, test scores, and whether the student attended
selective universities (DummySel).
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HomeTuition× DummyLowIncome 0.043** 0.013***
Information Sources 0.036*** 0.011***
public -0.118** -0.036***
Action Control 0.067** 0.020**
Importance of Reputation 0.195*** 0.059***
Const -25.612***
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a probit estimation of
applying for selective universities on students’ demographic, family income, test scores, and the average cost of
home-state nonselective universities, and the number of information sources about college application processes.
Table 16: Application, Attendance and Admission Rate
Parameter Estimates Marginal Effect
Specification Application Attendance Admission Application Attendance Admission
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Black 0.524*** 0.415*** 0.236 0.157*** 0.092*** 0.081
Asian 0.513*** 0.357*** 0.173 0.158*** 0.078*** 0.060
Hispanic 0.578*** 0.517*** 0.284** 0.176*** 0.117*** 0.097**
Female -0.010 0.063 0.088 -0.003 0.013 0.031
lnfincome 0.136*** 0.212*** 0.164*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.057***
lnParEdu 1.163*** 0.840*** 0.470* 0.341*** 0.168*** 0.163*
lnSAT 2.368*** 2.719*** 1.779*** 0.694*** 0.544*** 0.617***
lnGPA 0.051 0.694*** 1.088*** 0.015 0.139*** 0.377***
lnAPscore 0.227*** 0.180*** 0.081 0.067*** 0.036*** 0.028
lnAPclass 0.367*** 0.383*** 0.248*** 0.108*** 0.077*** 0.086***
Home Sel 10+ 0.110** 0.164*** 0.162*** 0.032** 0.033*** 0.056**
Constant -22.287*** -26.262*** -17.631***
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a probit estimation of
application, attendance, and admission (upon application) on students’ demographic, family income, test scores,
and the number of selective universities in student’s home state. Home Sel 10+ is the dummy variable whether
there are more than 10 selective universities in student’s home state. The marginal effect is calculated at mean.
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Table 17: Number of Information Sources Available Regarding College Application Processes
Variable (1) (2)
Black 0.356***(0.111) 0.370*** (0.111)
Asian 0.255***(0.100) 0.296*** (0.101)
Hispanic -0.090(0.122) -0.092*** (0.122)
Female -0.027(0.061) -0.014 (0.061)
lnfincome 0.135***(0.038) 0.111*** (0.039)
public -0.181*** (0.065)
Const 2.596***(0.434) 2.964*** (0.453)
Num Obs. 3,442 3,442
R-square 0.007 0.008
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). The sample consists of students
who attend four-year colleges. The dependent variable is the number of information sources available to students
during high school. ‘lnfincome’ indicates the log of family income. Since almost half of students did not take AP
tests, I use ln(AP + 1) instead of ln(AP ). Standard errors are in the parentheses.














Note. Data comes from the Baccalaureate and Beyond 1992. This is a OLS estimation of the log wage rate on
test scores, college selectivity (Isel), and college major.
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Isel ×DIncome1Q 0.050 -0.134
Constant 0.566 11.154
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a OLS estimation of the log
wage rate and a probit estimation of college graduation rate, including the interaction between college selectivity
and family income (the dummy variable for the bottom quintile of income distribution)











Isel ×DIncome1Q 0.052 0.139
Isel × lnSAT 0.045 0.111
Isel × lnGPA -0.222 -0.559
Constant 0.579 11.139***
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a OLS estimation of the log
wage rate and a probit estimation of college graduation rate, including the interaction between college selectivity
and family income (the dummy variable for the bottom quintile of income distribution), the interaction between
college selectivity and test scores.
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First Stage Estimation
Table 21: First Stage Estimates—Amount of Financial Aid









Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a OLS estimation of the
amount of grant a student receives conditional on her family income and test scores. From IPEDS 2004, I match
the tuition of each institution. From ELS2002, I observe the fraction of all grants out of total tuition. Based on
two variables, I imputed the amount of grants students received, and regress it on family income and test scores.
I assume that selective universities provide grants only provide need-based aid, whereas nonselective universities
provide both need-based and merit-based aid.
Table 22: First Stage Estimates—Number of AP Classes Offered by High School/Number of Infor-
mation Sources Available to Students







Private × lnfincome 0.163***
Private × lnParEdu -0.238
Constant -1.008** 2.858
Note. Data comes from the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS2002). This is a OLS estimation of the




Figure 15: Model Fit: Number of Applicants for Selective Universities by Family Income Quintile
Note. The graph shows the predicted number of applicants by family income quintile from the estimated model the
observed number of applicants by family income quintile from the data.
Figure 16: Model Fit: Number of Applicants for Selective Universities by Initial Ability Quintile
Note. The graph shows the predicted number of applicants by ability quintile from the estimated model the observed
number of applicants by ability quintile from the data.
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Figure 17: Model Fit: Number of Attendees in Selective Universities by Family Income Quintile
Note. The graph shows the predicted number of attendees by family income quintile from the estimated model the
observed number of attendees by family income quintile from the data.
Figure 18: Model Fit: Number of Attendees in Selective Universities by Initial Ability Quintile
Note. The graph shows the predicted number of attendees by ability quintile from the estimated model the observed
number of attendees by ability quintile from the data.
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Figure 19: Model Fit: Number of AP Classes Students Take by Family Income Quintile
Note. The graph shows the predicted number of AP classes students take by family income quintile from the estimated
model the observed number of AP classes students take by family income quintile from the data.
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Figure 20: Model Fit: Number of Applicants for Selective Universities by Initial Ability Quintile
Note. The graph shows the predicted number of AP classes students take by initial ability quintile from the estimated
model the observed number of AP classes students take by initial ability quintile from the data.
Figure 21: Estimated Ratio of the Direct Cost of Attending Selective Universities to Attending Nonselective
Universities
Note. This is the ratio between the direct cost of attending selective universities to that of attending nonselective
universities. I compare students with top and bottom quintile of math score distribution.
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Figure 22: Loan to Expected Income Ratio
Note. Estimated result about the loan to expected income ratio of low- and high-income students.
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Parameter Estimates













Note. The coefficient of unobservable ability θ is normalized to one so that it increase the wage rate one-to-one.
The distribution of θ is estimated and documented in Table 29.
Table 24: Estimation Result: Log Test Scores
Parameter ln(SAT) ln(AP+1) ln(GPA)
Black -0.0135 (0.4411) 0.0021 (0.1532) -0.0400 (0.1128)
Asian 0.0073 (0.4605) 0.0023 (0.2156) -0.0103 (0.1370)
Hispanic 0.0199 (0.5334) 0.0153 (0.1089) -0.0408 (0.1639)
Female 0.0137 (0.2175) 0.0329 (0.0440) 0.0098 (0.0571)
lnAmath 0.1933 (0.0203) 0.0629 (0.0191) 0.0798 (0.0130)
θ 0.3150 (3.8265) 0.1271 (0.0848) -0.1631 (0.7949)
Ipublic -0.0367 (0.1152) -0.0455 (0.1128) 0.2272 (0.0530)
ln(APclass+ 1) 0.0973 (0.0668) 0.2763 (0.0238) 0.1456 (0.0336)
Const 6.0568 (1.9464) 0.0218 (0.5128) 0.6959 (0.3787)
Note. Since almost half of students did not take AP tests, I use ln(AP + 1) instead of ln(AP ).
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Note. Since almost half of students did not take AP tests, I use ln(AP + 1) instead of ln(AP ).







ImpSameCollegeasP arent 0.8345 (7.0267)
Const -0.6247 (7.1526)
Note. ln(Numsel,hom) indicates the log number of selective universities in student’s home state. ImpRepuation is
student’s reported preference at the sophomore year of the high school over the importance of college’s reputation
in her college choice with scale 1 to 3. Similarly, ImpLocation and ImpSameCollegeasP arent are the reported
preference over college’s location and whether it is the same college as one of parents in student’s college choice.
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Table 28: Estimation Result: Application Cost
Parameter Application Cost Effort Cost of Taking AP class
lnAmath 0.222 (1.3641) -1.6313 (0.6952)




Const -5.7963 (2.7308) 9.6778 (1.3310)
Note. NumInformationSource is the log number of information sources available to students regarding college
application process (ln(Numsources + 1)). NumAPcalss is the number of AP classes offered by the high school.
Table 29: Estimation Result: Other Parameters
Parameter Other Parameters
β (Intertemporal Preference) 0.2562 (0.0381)
λ (Liquidity Constraint ) 0.7608 (0.2520)
ψ1 (Learning Ability ψfincome) 0.0282 (0.015)
ψ2 (Learning Ability ψParentEdu) 0.0599 (0.0340)






Note. β captures the intertemporal preference of consumption between college and working period. λ captures the
extent of liquidity constraint such that students cannot borrow up to λ fraction of her expected future income. ψ1
and ψ2 are the conditional mean of distribution of the unobservable ability θ. σj j ∈ {wage, lnSAT, lnAP, lnGPA}
are the standard error of the i.i.d. error shock on the wage rate, test scores. σAP is the standard error of i.i.d.
component in the effort cost of taking AP classes. σθ is the standard error of the distribution of θ.
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Estimation Result
Table 30: Estimated Income of Graduates from Nonselective Universities
Income1Q Income2Q Income3Q Income4Q Income5Q
Ability1Q 29,063 30,095 31,464 31,187 33,348
Ability2Q 31,644 32,235 33,560 33,512 34,550
Ability3Q 33,536 33,129 33,901 34,159 36,050
Ability4Q 33,357 34,333 35,463 35,201 36,859
Ability5Q 34,479 36,355 37,185 36,934 38,032
Note. Predicted labor income if students attend nonselective universities
Table 31: Estimated Income of Graduates from Selective Universities
Income1Q Income2Q Income3Q Income4Q Income5Q
Ability1Q 31,354 32,269 33,946 33,647 35,978
Ability2Q 34,140 34,777 36,206 36,155 37,274
Ability3Q 36,180 35,741 36,574 36,853 38,893
Ability4Q 35,988 37,040 38,260 37,977 39,765
Ability5Q 37,198 39,222 40,117 39,847 41,031
Note. Predicted labor income if students attend selective universities
Table 32: Cost Difference between Graduates of Selective Universities and Graduates of Nonselec-
tive Universities
Income1Q Income2Q Income3Q Income4Q Income5Q
Ability1Q 5,014 4,790 5,670 7,393 8,077
Ability2Q 7,118 6,691 6,818 9,535 9,247
Ability3Q 6,080 8,976 7,347 9,617 10,088
Ability4Q 8,577 8,620 8,783 9,211 11,557
Ability5Q 8,667 8,521 8,733 10,865 11,008
Note. Predicted difference of annual cost of attending selective universities and attending nonselective universities
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Table 33: Number of years until making break-even point for attending selective universities
Income1Q Income2Q Income3Q Income4Q Income5Q
Ability1Q 9.4 9.4 9.8 12.9 13.1
Ability2Q 12.2 11.3 11.0 15.4 14.5
Ability3Q 9.8 14.7 11.8 15.3 15.2
Ability4Q 14.0 13.6 13.4 14.2 17.0
Ability5Q 13.6 12.7 12.7 16.0 15.7
Note. The model assumes a repayment plan such that students repay the loan over 10 years after college gradu-
ation. I do not consider the wage growth over the life-cycle to find the break-even point.
Table 34: Amount of Student Loan When Attending Selective Universities
Income1Q Income2Q Income3Q Income4Q Income5Q
Ability1Q 23,434 18,393 15,472 9,667 -8,670
Ability2Q 24,143 19,708 16,174 11,245 -6,045
Ability3Q 23,908 20,515 17,157 12,391 -5,967
Ability4Q 26,001 22,292 17,509 14,090 -5,207
Ability5Q 25,614 23,270 18,236 13,671 -5,923
Note. Predicted loan amount if the student attends selective universities.
Table 35: Amount of Student Loan When Attending Nonselective Universities
Income1Q Income2Q Income3Q Income4Q Income5Q
Ability1Q 18,493 15,161 12,118 6,767 -12,657
Ability2Q 17,974 16,734 12,314 7,339 -10,114
Ability3Q 19,481 17,092 13,747 8,706 -10,432
Ability4Q 20,551 17,924 13,853 9,904 -9,572
Ability5Q 22,136 19,268 14,344 9,386 -10,617
Note. Predicted loan amount if the student attends nonselective universities.
Appendix G: Counterfactual Analysis
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Figure 23: Effort Choices as the Capacity in Selective Uni-
versities: Both Applicants and Nonapplicants
Note. I change the admission probability of applicants from 90% to 20% and see how student’s effort choices change
as competition is elevated. This is the average effort choice of low- and high-income students (the top and bottom
quintile of income distribution) including both applicants and non-applicants.
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Figure 24: Effort Choices as the Capacity in Selective Uni-
versities: Applicants
Note. I change the admission probability of applicants from 90% to 20% and see how student’s effort choices change
as competition is elevated. This is the average effort choice of low- and high-income applicants (the top and bottom
quintile of income distribution).
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Figure 25: What Explains the Application Gap
Note. To evaluate the importance of student’s own characteristics and environmental factors in explaining the different
application behaviors between rich and poor, I consider two representative students from the top and bottom quintile
of income distribution. They have population average characteristics but family income. The baseline is the case when
tuition is free, random admission into selective universities given the current capacity limit, and no heterogeneity in
θ between rich and poor students. Then I compare how the application behaviors of rich and poor students changes
as I introduce current tuition, test-based admission process, borrowing constraints, and heterogeneous θ.
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Figure 26: What Explains the Effort Gap
Note. To evaluate the importance of student’s own characteristics and environmental factors in explaining the effort
gap between rich and poor, I consider two representative students from the top and bottom quintile of income
distribution. They have population average characteristics but family income. The baseline is the case when tuition
is free, random admission into selective universities given the current capacity limit, and no heterogeneity in θ
between rich and poor students. Then I compare how the application behaviors of rich and poor students changes as
I introduce current tuition, test-based admission process, borrowing constraints, and heterogeneous θ.
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Figure 27: Percentage Explained By Initial Characteristics Regarding Choice Difference Between Rich and
Poor
Note. I classify students’ characteristics into 4 categories. A: initial math score, θ: unobservable ability, M:family
income, Z: all other characteristics including race, sex, parents’ education, home state, preference for college charac-
teristics. By the rich and poor, I refer to those from the top and bottom quintile of income distribution. I obtain
the average characteristics of students from the highest quintile and the bottom quintile of income distribution. In
the counterfactual exercise, I compare the representative student from the high-income family and a counterfactual
student who is different from the representative high-income student in one type of characteristic. The y-axis implies
to what extent difference in one type of characteristics between rich and poor students can explain the estimated true
choice difference between rich and poor students (percent).
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Figure 28: Amount of Student Loan by Family Income
Note. This is the predicted value of the amount of student loan conditional on the highest (rich) and the lowest
(poor)quintile of income distribution.
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Table 36: Borrowing Constraints, Number Applicants, and the AP Classes among Students from
the Bottom Quintile Income Distribution
Number of low-income applicants Baseline No Liquidity Constraint Random Financial Aid
All Initial Scores 131 139 120
Top Quintile Initial Score 36 38 33
Effort level (AP class)
All Initial Scores 0.9 1.0 0.8
Top Quintile Initial Score 2.6 2.7 2.4
Note. I round up the number for the report after simulating 100 times of the model. The total number of students
from the bottom quintile of income distribution is about 450.
Table 37: Borrowing Constraints and the Gap between Rich and Poor Among Top Quintile Initial
Score Students
Baseline No Liquidity Constraint Random Financial Aid
Difference in AP classes 0.91 0.78 (86%) 1.10 (122%)
Difference in the number of applicants 135 132 (97%) 139 (103%)
Difference in SAT score 71 65 (92%) 80 (113%)
Difference in wage rates 1.83 1.75(95%) 1.95 (107%)
Note. I round up the number for the report after simulating 100 times of the model. The number is the difference
between students within the top 20th percentile of initial test scores and from the top and the bottom quintile of
income distribution. The total number of students from the bottom quintile of income distribution is about 450.
Table 38: Choice Difference between the Highest and the Lowest Income Quintile Students Ex-
plained by Different Initial Characteristics
Percentage Change AP classes Private HS Application Rate
∆(Z) 2.2 0.9 1.4
∆(A) 65.9 35.9 43.4
∆(θ) 32.9 13.6 16.6
∆(M) 35.8 69.5 30.8
Note. I classify students’ characteristics into 4 categories. A: initial math score, θ: unobservable ability, M:family
income, Z: all other characteristics including race, sex, parents’ education, home state, preference for college
characteristics. I obtain the average characteristics of students from the highest quintile and the bottom quintile
of income distribution. For each exercise, I consider a student who has the exactly same characteristics as students
from the highest income quintile distribution, then replace one characteristic with the one of the bottom quintile
of income distribution. The y-axis implies to what extent difference in one type of characteristics between rich
and poor students can explain the estimated true choice difference between rich and poor students (percent).
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Table 39: Percentage Changes in the Number of AP Classes Conditional on Family Income and
Initial Ability Quintile
Number of AP Classes Income1Q Income2Q Income3Q Income4Q Income5Q
Ability1Q 7.9 12.7 10.7 9.8 6.3
Ability2Q 6.3 5.5 5.6 6.5 6.1
Ability3Q 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7
Ability4Q 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.1
Ability5Q 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.4 0.1
Note. The unit is percentage change in the main counterfactual analysis compared to the baseline model. The
main counterfactual analysis is the one that increases need-based aid from selective universities by $10,000 without
changing tuition and aid to other income groups. The admission cutoff is determined in equilibrium to equalize
the number of attendees and the number of seats available in selective universities.
Table 40: Counterfactual Analysis: Features of Selective Universities and Choice Difference between
Rich and Poor
Lowest Income Quintile AP class Application Private High School
Baseline 0.36 (100%) 13.43 (100%) 12.03 (100%)
Random Admission 0.05 (12.9%) 40.42 (301.0%) 31.92 (265.3%)
Tuition as Nonselective Univ 0.41 (116.3%) 15.44 (115.0%) 12.42 (103.2%)
Random Financial Aid 0.33 (91.9%) 12.20 (90.8%) 11.42 (94.9%)
No Nonpecuniary Benefit 0.05 (15.0%) 4.80 (35.7%) 11.39 (94.7%)
Highest Income Quintile AP class Application Private High School
Baseline 2.07 (100%) 42.10 (100%) 44.70 (100%)
Random Admission 0.08 (3.8%) 59.13 (140.5%) 61.40 (137.4%)
Tuition as Nonselective Univ 2.06 (99.7%) 40.77 (96.6%) 43.17 (99.7%)
Random Financial Aid 2.13 (102.7%) 43.66 (103.7%) 46.22 (103.4%)
No Nonpecuniary Benefit 0.09 (4.4%) 6.0 (14.3%) 12.49 (27.9%)
Difference between Two Groups AP class Application Private High School
Baseline 1.71 (100%) 28.67 (100%) 32.67 (100%)
Random Admission 0.03 (1.9%) 18.71 (65.3%) 29.48 (90.2%)
Tuition as Nonselective Univ 1.65 (96.2%) 25.33 (88.4%) 30.75 (94.1%)
Random Financial Aid 1.80 (104.9%) 31.46 (109.7%) 34.80 (106.5%)
No Nonpecuniary Benefit 0.04 (2.3%) 1.20 (4.2%) 1.10 (3.4%)
Note. I document how choices of students change if a certain feature of selective universities changes. In par-
ticular, I compare the choices of baseline model with those in each counterfactual exercise: (i) replacing the
admission criteria with a random one, (ii) replacing the tuition of selective universities with those of nonselective
universities, (iii) replacing need-based aid from selective universities into a random allocation, and (iv) if there is
no nonpecuniary benefit from attending selective universities.
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Table 41: Counterfactual Analysis: Features of Selective Universities and Outcome Difference
between Rich and Poor
Lowest Income Quintile Attendance Rate SAT lnWage Graduation Rate
Baseline 3.60 (100%) 937.42 (100%) 2.73 (100%) 62.41 (100%)
Random Admission 16.77 (465.8%) 936.02 (99.8%) 2.73 (100%) 61.86 (101.5%)
Tuition as Nonselective Univ 4.18 (115.0%) 939.21 (100.2%) 2.73 (100%) 62.37 (100.1%)
Random Financial Aid 3.34 (92.8%) 936.77 (99.9%) 2.73 (100%) 62.28 (100.3%)
No Nonpecuniary Benefit 4.80 (133.3%) 929.20 (99.1%) 2.73 (100%) 61.99 (99.3%)
Highest Income Quintile Attendance Rate SAT lnWage Graduation Rate
Baseline 18.85 (100%) 1119.8 (100%) 2.86 (100%) 69.61 (100%)
Random Admission 24.16 (128.2%) 1064.3 (95.04%) 2.83 (99.1%) 67.95 (97.6%)
Tuition as Nonselective Univ 17.48 (92.7%) 1118.12 (99.9%) 2.86 (100%) 69.64 (100%)
Random Financial Aid 20.08 (106.5%) 1122.61 (100.3%) 2.86 (101.8%) 69.67 (102.6%)
No Nonpecuniary Benefit 6.00 (31.8%) 1045.91 (93.4%) 2.83 (98.9%) 68.67 (98.6%)
Difference between Two Groups Attendance Rate SAT lnWage Graduation Rate
Baseline 15.25 (100%) 182.0 (100%) 0.125 (100%) 7.20 (100%)
Random Admission 7.39(48.5%) 128.27 (70.5%) 0.096 (77.1%) 6.09 (84.6%)
Tuition as Nonselective Univ 13.30(87.2%) 178.92 (98.3%) 0.12 (98.2%) 7.27 (101.0%)
Random Financial Aid 16.74(109.8%) 185.84 (102.1%) 0.13 (101.8%) 7.39 (102.6%)
No Nonpecuniary Benefit 1.20 (7.9%) 116.71 (64.1%) 0.10 (0.78%) 6.68 (92.8%)
Note. I document how academic achievement, graduation rate, and wage rate change if a certain feature of selective
universities changes. In particular, I compare the choices of baseline model with those in each counterfactual
exercise: (i) replacing the admission criteria with a random one, (ii) replacing the tuition of selective universities
with those of nonselective universities, (iii) replacing need-based aid from selective universities into a random
allocation, and (iv) if there is no nonpecuniary benefit from attending selective universities.
77
Table 42: Counterfactual Analysis: Number of Low-Income Applicants
Number of low-income applicants Baseline (1) (2) (3)
All Initial Ability 131 149 (114%) 126 (96%) 181 (38%)
Top Quintile Initial Ability 36 41 (113%) 36 (99%) 32 (89%)
Effort level (AP class)
All Initial Ability 0.9 1.03 (113%) 0.91 (100%) 0.47 (52%)
Top Quintile Initial Ability 2.58 2.88 (102%) 2.62 (102%) 1.46 (57%)
Number of low-income applicants (4) (5) (6)
All Initial Ability 122 (93%) 209 (159%) 134 (102%)
Top Quintile Initial Ability 34 (94%) 45 (127%) 37 (102%)
Effort level (AP class)
All Initial Ability 0.81 (89%) 1.03 (114%) 0.99 (109%)
Top Quintile Initial Ability 2.38 (92%) 2.57 (99%) 2.75 (106%)
Note. I round up the number for the report after simulating 100 times of the model. (1): doubling need-based aid
from selective universities ($12,000 more grants) for the students from the bottom quintile of income distribution,
(2): merit-based aid with the same budget spending as (1), (3): the Texas Top 10 Law (only GPA is taken into
account in the admission process), (4): increasing need-based aid from nonselective universities by $12,000 for
the low-income students, (5): income quota system that gives bonus points in the admission process to double
the number of low-income attendees in selective universities, (6): offering more AP classes to low-income students
with the same extra budget needed to implement increasing need-based aid from selective universities by $12,000.
Table 43: Counterfactual Analysis: Gaps in the Outcome of the Low-income and High-income
High-Ability Students
Baseline (1) (2) (3)
Difference in AP classes 0.91 0.60 (67%) 0.90 (100%) 0.43 (47%)
Difference in the number of applicants 135 130 (96%) 136 (101%) 118 (87%)
Difference in SAT score 71 57 (80%) 72 (101%) 43 (61%)
Difference in wage rates 1.83 1.65 (90%) 1.84 (100%) 1.65 (90%)
(4) (5) (6)
Difference in AP classes 1.12 (124%) 0.84 (93%) 0.74 (82%)
Difference in the number of applicants 138 (102%) 119 (88%) 134 (99%)
Difference in SAT score 82 (115%) 57 (80%) 64 (89%)
Difference in wage rates 1.91 (107%) 1.41 (77%) 1.77 (96%)
Note. I round up the number for the report after simulating 100 times of the model. (1): doubling need-based aid
from selective universities ($12,000 more grants) for the students from the bottom quintile of income distribution,
(2): merit-based aid with the same budget spending as (1), (3): the Texas Top 10 Law (only GPA is taken into
account in the admission process), (4): increasing need-based aid from nonselective universities by $12,000 for
the low-income students, (5): income quota system that gives bonus points in the admission process to double
the number of low-income attendees in selective universities, (6): offering more AP classes to low-income students
with the same extra budget needed to implement increasing need-based aid from selective universities by $12,000.
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Out-of-Sample Prediction
Figure 29: Out-of-Sample Prediction: Composition Rate of Applicants by Family Income Quintile
Note. To assess the external validity of the model, I consider a out-of-sample prediction using the National Education
Longitudinal Study of 1988. First, I estimate the financial aid policy of the NELS1988 cohort. Second, I substitute
the financial aid policy of the ELS2002 sample with that of the NELS1988, then I obtain the predicted counterfactual
outcomes based on the estimated structural model. Third, I compare this predicted outcome with the observed data
in the NELS1988. During the periods, the aggregate application rate increased more than 24% (from 18% to 42%).
Thus I focus on the composition rate than the application rate.
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Figure 30: Out-of-Sample Prediction: Composition Rate of Attendees by Family Income Quintile
Note. To assess the external validity of the model, I consider a out-of-sample prediction using the National Education
Longitudinal Study of 1988. First, I estimate the financial aid policy of the NELS1988 cohort. Second, I substitute
the financial aid policy of the ELS2002 sample with that of the NELS1988, then I obtain the predicted counterfactual
outcomes based on the estimated structural model. Third, I compare this predicted outcome with the observed data
in the NELS1988. During the periods, the aggregate application rate increased more than 24% (from 18% to 42%).
Thus I focus on the composition rate rather than the attendance rate.
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Additional Tables











ln(Wage) 1 2.8229 2.8109
ln(SAT ) 1 6.9931 6.9774
ln(GPA+ 1) 1 1.1771 1.1591
ln(APscore+ 1) 1 0.4562 04618
Isel 1 0.2027 0.2089
IBA 1 0.7363 0.7596
Note. There are four outcome variables in the model: wage rates, test scores (SAT and AP score) and GPA,
admission results, college graduation rates. I also include the interaction terms of each outcome variable with a
set of instrumental variables in the moment condition.











NAP 1 2.8229 2.8109
Iprivate 1 6.9931 6.9774
Iapply 1 1.1771 1.1591
L× IBA × Isel 1 0.1037 0.1070
L× IBA × (1− Isel) 1 0.4750 0.4380
Note. There are six choice variables in the model: the number of AP classes students take (NAPclass), whether to
attend private high school (Iprivate), whether to apply for selective universities (Isel), consumption during college
period (C1), consumption when working (C2), and the amount of student loan (L). Because I do not directly
observe consumption levels, I do not include consumptions in the moment condition. The model predicts the
optimal consumption level based on family income, labor earning, and student loan. I also include the interaction
terms of (NAP , Iprivate, Iapplication, L) with a set of instrumental variables such as family income, initial math
score, race, sex, tuition level, reported preference for college characteristics.
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